The Cubs’ Top Four Hitters May Pose An Insurmountable Hurdle For The Padres

The Padres have a problem that is very unusual in the postseason: a lineup constructed to display its Achilles' heel. The left-handed power and the switch-hitter of the Chicago Cubs present a strategic dilemma. 

The Cubs' Core Strength: Busch, Hoerner, Happ, Tucker

The four best Chicago hitters (including three lefties: Busch, Hoerner, Tucker, and a switch-hitter, Happ) give any pitching staff a frightening front. A short series of numbers indicates why they pose such a danger to San Diego.

Michael Busch has been particularly nasty against right-handed pitchers. In 2025, his statistics against righties are a .261 Batting Average, .343 On-Base Percentage, .523 Slugging Percentage, and .866 OPS.

The performance is well above average, showcasing his strong plate discipline and power.

Per Baseball Savant, Busch hits an average exit velocity of 92.2 mph, a hard-hit rate of 47.3%, and a barrel rate of 17.1% so far this season. Against lefties, Busch is less dangerous: in 86 at-bats against lefties, he hit .207/.274/.368. 

Nico Hoerner, though less flashy in pure slugging, drives contact and forces pitchers to execute. He doesn’t strike out often and has elite hand-eye skills that can prolong counts, a dangerous trait in postseason games where fatigue and matchups matter.

Ian Happ, also from the left side, brings consistent power and is difficult to neutralize even with shifting or a glove-heavy alignment.

Kyle Tucker, when healthy, is one of the best lefty power threats in the league; his power tools make him a swing-and-miss bat for many starters.

The structure of that group means Padres' staff must either neutralize lefties (a problematic spot for them) or force the Cubs into less potent matchups. Either outcome is a tightrope walk for the Padres.

Padres’ Roster Tilt and Why the Imbalance Matters

The Padres' rotation is almost entirely right-handed. Their bullpen, while deep and elite, does not offer a large arsenal of left-handed relief arms. Adrian Morejon stands out as the only trustworthy southpaw option. In 2025, Morejon was outstanding: in 75 appearances, he posted a 2.08 ERA with a 0.90 WHIP. 

But even Morejon will be taxed in a multi-game series if he must repeatedly face Chicago’s top hitters (Busch or Tucker) in key innings. Beyond him, the Padres have Mason Miller, who has struck out a high percentage of batters; however, as a right-handed pitcher, he is vulnerable to the left-handed Cubs lineup. Miller’s 2025 was a 2.63 ERA and incredible strikeout totals.

The Cubs’ bullpen has also improved dramatically over the course of the season. Their second-half strikeout rate jumped from one of the worst to one of the better ones in MLB. The Cubs may bring multiple lefty options out of the pen. The Padres’ limited lefty depth means matchup flexibility is constrained; they may be forced into less-than-ideal cross-match scenarios.

Furthermore, in a recent projection, FanGraphs’ “54 Outs to Freedom” preview highlighted how differently the two bullpens performed in high leverage. The Padres’ bullpen posted among the best metrics in the league, while the Cubs, despite earlier struggles, had shown significant improvement. 

That suggests that while the Padres’ relievers are capable of excelling, the Cubs’ improved bullpen hints at an advantage, especially when Chicago’s top order is giving them chances.

When and How the Cubs’ Top Order Can Inflict Damage

In a short series, execution and sequencing are magnified. The Cubs can turn much of the matchup battle into a chess game.

When a Cubs starter hands the baton to their pen, the possibility of bringing in a left-handed reliever to face Busch or Tucker looms. That forces the Padres to decide: do you make a call to the pen for the matchup? Do you burn your own lefty (Morejon) early? Or do you stick with your regular relievers and risk handing over platoon advantage?

The Cubs can also manipulate which hitters see which relievers. Busch, operating from the left side, will usually start against right-handers; however, with switchable options, Chicago can adjust their order to avoid undesired matchups. Happ in the 3/4 hole is a safety valve: even if the Padres manage to neutralize Busch or Hoerner temporarily, Happ ensures that the pressure continues before Tucker reappears.

For San Diego, the levers are limited. One option is to stretch starters, riding Pivetta, Cease, or Darvish deeper into games to avoid exposing the bottom of the bullpen. But that strategy risks fatigue or explosion if the third time through the order goes poorly, as it did in game one on Tuesday.

Another option is to “front-load” Morejon, or even consider using lefty sooner than ideal, sacrificing flexibility. But that might open holes later in the game for Chicago to exploit.

The Cubs’ top four hitters are not just good, they are structurally dangerous for San Diego. Busch’s elite splits against righties, Hoerner’s contact and consistency, Happ’s switch versatility, and Tucker’s left-handed power collectively force San Diego into an unfavorable strategic posture.

The Cubs can force expensive choices, either burn Morejon early, overextend starters, or accept platoon disadvantages. Meanwhile, Chicago’s bullpen, having improved in the second half, is no longer a liability that San Diego can reliably exploit.