Yirsandy Rodríguez

The depth of the San Diego Padres’ bullpen continues to make the team one of the toughest contenders to overcome in a playoff series, especially if it is a series of fewer than seven games. There's enough elite arms to handle high-leverage pressure and often cover for the lack of depth among the starting pitchers. Behind the main names, left-hander Kyle Hart has emerged as another arm to keep an eye on. The southpaw has not allowed a run in 26 of his 40 relief appearances this year, has a 3.15 xERA and a 50.6 GB% rate. His ability to generate ground balls frequently and limit left-handed hitters has been one of the most attractive trends in his profile. He currently ranks in the 95th percentile in HardHit%, the 90th in GB%, and his sinker ranks in the 89th percentile in run value. Hart has not allowed a home run since July 4, a streak that extends to 112 batters faced. He has held left-handed hitters to a .652 OPS and has not allowed a home run against right-handed hitters, who are producing just a .605 OPS. Since the All-Star break, Hart’s adjustments have become much more noticeable in the Padres’ bullpen, which has the second-best xERA (1.77) in the league. Name SV G IP K/9 HR/9 GB% vFA (pi) FIP WAR Bradgley Rodriguez 2 20 21 12.0 0.4 47.3% 98.3 1.62 0.7 Kyle Hart 0 14 17.2 10.7 0.0 56.5% 93.8 1.91 0.5 Randy Vásquez 0 4 13.1 6.1 0.0 54.3% 94.9 2.20 0.3 Mason Miller 7 17 17.2 16.3 1.0 43.3% 101.6 2.30 0.6 Adrian Morejon 1 20 24.2 11.7 0.4 47.4% 99.2 2.73 0.6 Yuki Matsui 0 18 21.1 10.6 0.4 40.5% 91.8 2.91 0.4 Wandy Peralta 0 16 18 5.5 1.5 43.1% 95.8 4.54 0.0 Griffin Canning 0 10 17.2 9.2 2.0 47.2% 94.9 5.02 -0.1 Hart has the second-best FIP in the group, mostly because his pitches continue to generate ground balls at a massive rate. In the middle of this process, one of his key adjustments was turning the sinker into the primary weapon in his arsenal. Since June, it has become the most-used pitch in his repertoire, replacing the sweeper. The results have been highly revealing, limiting the opposition to a .233 xSLG, the lowest among any left-handed reliever in the game. Player PA xSLG xwOBA K% Hard Hit% Hader, Josh LHP 55 .265 .190 34.5% 40.0% Hart, Kyle LHP 35 .223 .225 34.3% 20.0% Miller, Erik LHP 48 .225 .247 22.9% 13.8% Sommers, Drew LHP 42 .229 .250 21.4% 25.0% Peralta, Wandy LHP 46 .324 .261 8.7% 37.5% Mayza, Tim LHP 41 .346 .270 19.5% 48.4% Bernardino, Brennan LHP 50 .354 .281 10.0% 35.7% Ashby, Aaron LHP 66 .326 .284 16.7% 42.9% Dodd, Dylan LHP 51 .386 .295 23.5% 45.5% Garcia, Brandyn LHP 38 .389 .303 15.8% 41.4% Morejon, Adrian LHP 63 .366 .319 14.3% 27.7% Suter, Brent LHP 50 .378 .321 14.0% 23.7% Hill, Tim LHP 74 .453 .342 4.1% 40.9% Bruihl, Justin LHP 59 .353 .343 8.5% 35.6% Alvarado, José LHP 60 .413 .376 10.0% 33.3% Soto, Gregory LHP 40 .456 .393 2.5% 34.4% Ferrer, José A. LHP 72 .537 .404 9.7% 43.1% Young, Danny LHP 37 .548 .425 13.5% 68.0% Moll, Sam LHP 39 .574 .456 10.3% 63.0% Hart stands out in this group of qualified left-handed relievers with at least 35 plate appearances ending with a sinker since June. He is not only leading with the lowest xSLG, but also ranks second in all the other metrics, alongside dominant left-handers who have had a great year such as Josh Hader and Erik Miller. Now, the point we should still keep an eye on is how Hart is responding in high-pressure situations. Combining his appearances with the tying run at the plate, the tying run on base and the tying run on deck, his .418 xSLG allowed is fairly similar to his .411 mark for the entire season, but his walk rate has jumped from 8.7% to 10.9%. His strikeout rate has similarly fallen from 23.2% to 13.0%. This is a total of 12 plate appearances, which, while not a large sample and something that can change with a few more matchups, reflects what middle relievers often face: one- or two-batter situations and, in Hart’s case, some lefty-on-lefty matchups that can result in key moments of a game. For his part, he has been reserved for those small moments of walking a tightrope. In 55% of his 40 relief appearances, he has faced five or fewer batters and, interestingly, in 55% of those 22 games, he has never gone beyond three hitters. For the Padres, it is an absolute relief to know that behind Mason Miller, Adrian Morejón, Bradgley Rodríguez, Yuki Matsui and Wandy Peralta, they have Kyle Hart’s left arm. Though he may not be a high-leverage savant, the Friars already have enough of those. More importantly, he adds quality depth to a bullpen that is poised to be worked hard through the end of the regular season and into October. View full article

If we stop only at Walker Buehler’s 4.66 ERA, it would be enough to worry us down the stretch, with the San Diego Padres fighting for a Wild Card spot. I don’t like to blame ERA, though, since no statistic can tell the entire story of a pitcher in a single number. Buehler’s case is very interesting. Despite his high ERA, the Padres are 18-9 in games he has started. If we take away his three worst consecutive starts of the entire season, when he allowed 20 runs in 11 innings between July 1 and July 11, his ERA drops to 3.59. At that point, it gets pretty close to the 3.19 ERA he has posted over 42 ⅓ innings in his last eight starts. His inconsistencies in July reflected the problems that have followed the right-hander: his inability to stay ahead in the count and the problems that have affected his fastball and changeup. As the season has progressed, his strategy has changed. In April, the slider was his main weapon under pressure in decisive counts. Then, the sweeper took that place. In June, he switched to the cutter. In July, he went back to the slider after allowing three home runs and a .758 xSLG with the changeup. In August, his knuckle curve took control, while the sinker returned to dominating. In August, hitters posted a 32.7 O-Swing% against Buehler, his highest rate in any month this season. The overall results were encouraging, as he allowed the second-lowest wOBA (.308) of the entire year—only behind the .305 he allowed in June. But nothing summarizes Buehler’s season as a starter this year better than his performances when the pressure is highest. That was one of his best characteristics as a Dodgers pitcher, and it still seems that he can get an extra gear in the biggest moments. I extended the research I started when I wrote about Michael King’s improvements last week, and Buehler’s results really surprised me. I chose only the games involving teams that, if the regular season ended today, would have secured a direct postseason or Wild Card spot in the National League. They would be: the Milwaukee Brewers, Los Angeles Dodgers, Atlanta Braves, Chicago Cubs, Philadelphia Phillies and San Diego Padres. I chose all the games between them and filtered for pitchers who have faced at least 120 batters. There are 16 pitchers who meet that criterion. Take a look at the xFIP leaders: Jacob Misiorowski (MIL), 2.34 Chris Sale (ATL), 2.58 Yoshinobu Yamamoto (LAD), 2.64 Cristopher Sánchez (PHI), 2.71 Kyle Harrison (MIL), 3.44 Michael King (SDP), 3.71 Shota Imanaga (CHC), 3.71 Bryce Elder (ATL), 3.71 Most of the Game 1 postseason starters are in that top eight. There are other pitchers like Zack Wheeler (3.45) and Shane Drohan (3.19) who have been dominant, but they did not qualify because they have not faced enough batters. Now comes the point that will probably surprise you. Among so many top-level pitchers, Buehler also has a place when it comes to pitching under pressure. Name Tm G IP TBF AVG BABIP K-BB% HR/FB ERA xERA xFIP Jacob Misiorowski MIL 7 46 168 .151 .235 30.4% 2.6% 0.78 1.67 2.34 Walker Buehler SDP 7 37 155 .188 .214 7.7% 9.1% 4.38 4.03 4.98 Yoshinobu Yamamoto LAD 7 44 2/3 171 .192 .265 23.4% 10.7% 1.21 2.81 2.64 Chris Sale ATL 8 52 2/3 207 .201 .291 28.5% 4.3% 1.37 2.45 2.58 Michael King SDP 6 36 148 .206 .281 14.9% 0.0% 2.00 3.47 3.71 Justin Wrobleski LAD 7 43 1/3 180 .220 .232 17.2% 17.9% 5.19 4.40 4.08 Kyle Harrison MIL 7 37 2/3 157 .248 .281 22.9% 20.0% 3.82 3.15 3.44 Emmet Sheehan LAD 6 29 2/3 126 .250 .311 20.6% 13.5% 4.25 3.47 3.82 Bryce Elder ATL 5 30 2/3 131 .262 .309 13.0% 10.7% 4.70 4.64 3.71 Shota Imanaga CHC 7 41 171 .267 .306 16.4% 12.2% 4.17 3.83 3.71 Roki Sasaki LAD 7 31 2/3 145 .274 .278 5.5% 21.4% 6.25 6.33 5.33 Colin Rea CHC 7 32 1/3 146 .277 .313 9.6% 13.9% 5.29 5.71 4.48 Griffin Canning SDP 8 27 126 .284 .325 10.3% 16.7% 8.00 4.99 4.87 Aaron Nola PHI 7 35 155 .289 .327 15.5% 21.4% 6.69 4.65 3.86 Cristopher Sánchez PHI 7 42 1/3 187 .290 .368 20.9% 15.6% 3.19 3.75 2.71 Randy Vásquez SDP 7 27 130 .361 .333 0.8% 18.5% 8.00 11.97 6.39 Behind Miz, Buehler is the pitcher with the lowest batting average allowed and, even more strikingly, the lowest BABIP (.214) on the entire list. He has done it so far by leaving the opposition with the lowest line-drive rate (9.8%) in the group while still getting himself into trouble: he trails only Roki Sasaki (12.4 BB%) with a 12.3 BB% rate. Buehler has pitched at this level by solving many difficult situations, but also by getting himself into trouble because of his lack of command. Even so, he has not shied away from the toughest moments, holding the opposition to a .214/.267/.429 line in high-leverage situations. In 18 of his 27 starts, Buehler has completed at least five innings. In 21 instances, he has allowed three or fewer runs. He has been a more reliable arm than his peripheral numbers show. And, most importantly of all, he continues to show that he can compete under pressure. At this point in the season, that ability is what the Padres need most if they want to compete in October. View full article

In a certain way, it may seem that this version of Michael King is less dominant than before. His drop in strikeout rate to 7.79 K/9 this season suggests a greater risk when allowing contact. However, far from hurting King, his new approach to attacking the opposition has brought a good part of what the San Diego Padres will need if they reach the postseason: durability and efficiency. Barring an unexpected debacle, the Dodgers will dominate the National League West, so the option for the Padres will be to look for a spot to compete for the Wild Card. Reaching October with that challenge requires great ability and collective cohesion to face short series, where a bad start can be fatal. Above all during this second half of the season, the Padres have shown that they can play at a high level. The offense has been at its best, the defense is doing its job, and they have the best closer in the game leading one of the toughest bullpens to get through. The least consistent part of the equation has been the performances of the starting pitching corps. The Padres have used 14 starters who have made at least three starts. Through it all, King remains the main man in the rotation, with 27 starts and 2.1 fWAR. If his new profile, with less strikeout power, has raised doubts for you, you should hear this: hitters are producing against him the lowest BABIP (.252) and the lowest Pull-Air% rate (14.4%) of his career, and he is inducing his highest percentage of ground balls (45.2 GB%) since 2022. King’s main pitch remains the sinker, but he has replaced part of the presence of his fastball with greater use of the changeup (27.3%), the highest rate of his career. He has been more exposed to contact, but his performance shows that this version has also given the Padres consistency and durability. Those adjustments have not limited King’s ability to generate swings and misses, mind you. Quite the opposite. Although his strikeout rate has dropped from 9.33 K/9 to 7.79, his SwStr% rate remains intact at 10.4%. Instead, he is now providing more durability, with an average of 5⅔ innings per start. That level of depth and efficiency takes on even more value when we think about games under pressure during the postseason. For the Padres, even with the quality of their bullpen, King’s deep starts contrast with a collective problem in the rotation: San Diego ranks toward the bottom of the league in average innings from their starters, with just 4⅓ innings per start this season. Since July 3, King has recorded at least six innings in eight of his 10 starts, with a 2.72 ERA and 4.24 FIP in that span. The FIP remains relatively high, but the results have been there. He continues to be the number one starter in the rotation without question, and his competitiveness shows it. If we choose all the possible contenders for the Padres looking toward the postseason, look where King appears among the pitchers who have faced at least 120 opponents. For the ranking, I chose all the starts by starters against the Los Angeles Dodgers, the Milwaukee Brewers, the Philadelphia Phillies, the Atlanta Braves and the Chicago Cubs, since they represent the teams the Padres are most likely to run into in October. Name Tm G IP ERA xFIP HR/9 GB% TBF K/9 BB/9 K/BB Michael King SDP 6 36 2.00 3.72 0.00 48.4% 148 9.0 3.5 2.6 Logan Webb SFG 6 42 1.29 3.35 0.21 52.2% 156 6.9 1.7 4.0 Jacob Misiorowski MIL 6 39 0.92 2.53 0.23 45.2% 143 11.5 2.1 5.6 Matthew Liberatore STL 8 41 3.07 3.66 0.44 35.9% 169 10.3 3.3 3.1 Chris Sale ATL 6 37.2 1.19 2.63 0.48 45.8% 148 10.5 1.4 7.3 Eduardo Rodriguez ARI 8 47.2 2.08 4.19 0.76 38.0% 192 7.0 2.1 3.4 Cade Cavalli WSN 6 34.2 2.34 3.37 0.78 47.7% 139 9.9 2.3 4.2 Nolan McLean NYM 7 41 3.07 3.24 0.88 48.0% 164 10.5 3.3 3.2 Brandon Pfaadt ARI 6 36.2 2.95 4.39 0.98 44.6% 145 5.4 2.2 2.4 Foster Griffin WSN 8 46 2.54 4.20 1.37 44.8% 187 7.0 2.7 2.6 There are big names there. But against the big rivals the Padres could face in October, King has not allowed a single home run this season after challenging 148 opponents. His overall xFIP of 4.32 drops to 3.72 when he faces the best contenders in the National League. He has also allowed a high ground-ball rate and maintains an average of six innings per start in that group. The exposure to more contact remains a risk that King has taken with his adjustments this season, but he has been reliable in the big challenges. And that is the comparison that weighs the most here: how the frontline starters in the rotation have pitched against their possible contenders. No other Padres starting pitcher has come close to that level of dominance, which shows that King remains the number one starter in the rotation. Name Tm G IP TBF xFIP xERA Michael King SDP 6 36 148 3.72 3.46 JP Sears SDP 4 20.1 85 4.45 5.10 Walker Buehler SDP 7 37 155 4.99 4.02 Randy Vásquez SDP 5 23 105 6.43 11.55 Griffin Canning SDP 4 17.2 78 5.05 5.23 There is still not enough of a sample to evaluate Robbie Ray and Casey Mize, but as the end of the season approaches, we will have a better idea of how they have responded under pressure. Another detail that marks King’s consistency and has caught my attention is his effectiveness when he pitches with four days of rest. In those games, he has a 5-1 record and a 1.91 ERA. King leads all MLB starters in that situation with the lowest OPS+ (52) allowed, leaving behind Dylan Cease (54) of the Blue Jays, an American League Cy Young contender. In six of those 10 starts this year, he has left his opponents at one run or none; he has two starts allowing one hit and on only one occasion did they score three runs against him. On the other hand, when he rests one or two more days, he has a losing record of 3-7 and his ERA shoots up to 4.44 in 13 starts. Obviously, the Padres have had to distribute his workload, but the fact that King has been responding better with normal rest is another of the big pieces of good news looking toward the playoffs. View full article

Before this season, Casey Mize’s slider had never been his most reliable pitch. After allowing a .529 slugging percentage in 2024, he tried to get it back in 2025. The adjustments led to an interesting improvement in his Vertical Break from 0.2 to 4.5 inches. This season, Mize began giving his slider more presence in key situations. He increased its usage by 11.0 percentage points, and kept the opposition under control while his fastball and split-finger continued to function as his most dominant pitches. However, the story began to take a turn after June and, after arriving in San Diego, the slider has become a problem for Mize and the Padres. Month O-Swing% Z-Swing% O-Contact% Z-Contact% SwStr% Mar/Apr 25.0% 50.7% 55.6% 76.3% 11.7% May 32.3% 51.5% 30.0% 76.5% 17.2% Jun 23.1% 50.0% 50.0% 89.5% 7.8% Jul 18.6% 78.1% 37.5% 88.0% 10.3% Aug 13.6% 40.8% 66.7% 85.0% 5.4% Aug vs Jul -5.0% -37.3% 29.2% -3.0% -4.9% Aug vs Jun -9.5% -9.2% 16.7% -4.5% -2.4% The most concerning points here lies in opposing hitters’ ability to connect with pitches outside the strike zone. They are not doing it with more swings. Since June, O-Swing% has fallen by 9.5%, but hitters have posted a 16.7% increase in O-Contact%. Mize has increased his slider usage by 7.0% since joining the Padres’ rotation in August, and opponents have raised their O-Contact% rate to 66.7%, the highest in any month this season. Mize has also stopped generating swings and misses. His SwStr% rate peaked at 11.7% and 17.2% between March/April and May. Over the last two months, it has fallen from 10.3% in July to 5.4% this month. There is one key point that may be at the root of the situation: the Vertical Drop on Mize’s slider has declined from 36.8 inches in his dominant 2024 season to 30.3 this year. Left-handed hitters, in particular, have taken advantage of Mize’s command lapses to produce better at-bats against his slider. Split PA K% BB% xBA xOBP xSLG BABIP Whiff% Hard Hit% Ideal Attack Angle % vs LHB Mar/Apr-Jun 32 21.9% 6.3% .181 .238 .361 .136 25.0% 47.8% 43.8% vs LHB Jul-Aug 22 4.5% 9.1% .344 .410 .516 .368 5.7% 47.4% 58.8% Differences — -17.4% 2.8% .163 .172 .155 .232 -19.3% -0.4% 15.0% As expected, Mize has stopped trusting his slider, limiting its usage with two strikes this month to 17.9% compared to the pitch distribution in July. That answers part of the reasons why we have seen his K% fall by 17.4%. That said, the danger has been present when left-handed hitters have put the ball in play over the last two months. To begin with, look at the 15.0% increase in Ideal Attack Angle. That says a lot about how well hitters are reading his pitches when attacking the slider. Then, the result of the expected metrics tells us the rest of the story: left-handed hitters have adjusted in such a way that they have raised their BABIP by .232 points, while cutting their swing-and-miss rate by a significant margin. There are almost no differences in HardHit%, but even without increasing the quality of contact, the production has been much higher across all expected metrics. Here we have the xSLG averages on the left during the initial stretch between March/April and June against left-handed hitters. Then, the rest of the season. Hitters are crushing the slider from the middle of the zone toward the lower outside corner. They have also gotten devastating contact in the lower inside part of the zone. Mize’s slider has only had a little life when it stays in the upper part of the zone or moves away. During the first months of the season, that was also where the most dominant trend was marked. Mize will have to choose a new plan to sustain his repertoire. He has the weapons, but his slider is definitely not at the level it needs to be to prove that the Padres’ bet on strengthening their rotation at the trade deadline was the right one. View full article

With September approaching and Mason Miller having logged 56⅓ innings, less than 10 frames of his career high (65) including the playoffs, there are several questions facing the San Diego Padres. Should they manage Miller’s workload a little more carefully? Or is it worth taking the necessary risks to win games? Miller is second in the National League with 32 saves, a 0.896 ERA, a 0.87 FIP and 3.2 fWAR. His imposing fastball is averaging 101.4 mph, and he has an absurd strikeout rate of 16.31 batters per nine innings. Miller is also the reliever with the most games finished (47) in the National League, another indication of his heavy workload. If the Padres’ plan is to give him rest whenever possible, lightening his workload could keep the right-hander much more prepared to face October. However, it is inevitable to think about the risk the bullpen would face when he is unavailable. At a postgame press conference earlier this month after Bradgley Rodriguez handled a save opportunity, manager Craig Stammen said that “there is absolutely nothing wrong with Mason. This was simply a matter of rest.” He also praised Rodriguez’s ability: “He’s going to get some opportunities here when Mason can’t pitch. We also have other guys in the bullpen: Adrián [Morejon], Jeremiah [Estrada], Jason [Adam] and all of them are capable of pitching the ninth inning." The Padres’ bullpen depth has been decisive throughout the season. They have the second-most innings pitched (565) in the National League and lead all of MLB with 7.5 fWAR. Miller and Morejón (2.3) have been the main pillars, combining for 5.5, followed by Rodriguez with 1.3. If we add Wandy Peralta to the equation, this is the result of the heavy workload each of them has carried: -Miller: 56 ⅓ innings (65 in 2024); six games below last season’s career high. -Morejón: 72 innings (73 2/3 last year); 14 fewer games than last year. -Peralta: 64 innings (71 ⅔ last year); 16 fewer games. -Rodriguez: 58 innings (45 ⅓ between the minor leagues and the Padres); 14 more games. That summary leads us to think about a bigger problem, since this is not just about Miller’s workload. Morejón, Peralta and Rodriguez have also accumulated a large number of innings and appearances, so they are also very likely to receive some rest. From there, the big question is how much risk the Padres will take when Miller is unavailable. And not all the answers are in the bullpen. The pitching analysis should begin with the starters. Throughout the season, the team has leaned on the bullpen because of the inconsistency of its rotation. The Padres still have the third-worst average innings per start, at 4⅓ per game. At the same time, they have the third-highest percentage of starters (41%) who do not reach 80 pitches. In other words, literally, the bullpen has carried the bulk of the outs every day. My colleagues @Steve Drumwright and @Randy Holt have insisted on the Padres Mission podcast about the need for the Padres’ starters to be able to deliver deep outings. Since Aug. 3, when Casey Mize and Robbie Ray arrived following the trade deadline, San Diego starters have covered 110 innings over 21 games, good for about 5.2 per start. Although Mize and Ray have had their lumps with the Friars, there is already a slight improvement in the rotation’s durability. We also shouldn’t rule out the offense becoming a turning point; since the deadline, the Padres are fifth in team wRC+ (110). That said, I see no reason to think that Miller’s rest, along with that of some of the other top relievers, is going to cause chaos. Between the seventh and ninth innings, the Padres have allowed the lowest slugging percentage (.334) in the entire league, tied with the Milwaukee Brewers’ pitchers. The bullpen’s only vulnerable point has come when relievers face the opposing lineup for a second time, allowing a .319/.391/.566 offensive line, with the fourth-highest OPS+ (145) in the entire league. So, even with Miller receiving more rest and likely taking turns with Morejón and Rodriguez to close out games, the most concerning point I see here remains the starting pitching. If they can go deeper and the offense continues to produce in clutch situations, the Padres will remain a strong contender heading into October. View full article

In baseball, one of the biggest concerns for a left-handed hitter is almost always facing a pitcher with the same profile. It is never comfortable enough, and one of the reasons is that you simply do not see lefty-vs.-lefty matchups every day. San Diego Padres second baseman Jake Cronenworth would tell you the opposite about that approach. There is a major reason behind that conversation, and it is that Cronenworth is being neutralized by right-handed pitchers. His 75 wRC+ in 222 plate appearances is the ninth-lowest in the league among left-handed hitters with at least 200 PA against right-handed pitchers this year. But that is not the worst part. Any hitter can go through a slump and then show signs of recovery. Cronenworth’s problem is unprecedented. He is going through the worst stretch of his career, and the offensive collapse has been devastating. Listen to and internalize what this combination of inconsistencies at the plate means: he is producing the highest ground-ball percentage of his career (50.0), the lowest line-drive percentage (16.4), along with his highest strikeout rate (23.0 K%). His .215/.308/.287 slash line, .595 OPS and .072 ISO are also career lows. Yes, there is more. The problems have reached his plate-discipline metrics, with career-worst rates in SwStr% (9.1), Contact% (79.4), O-Contact% (54.1) and O-Swing% (27.3). The strangest part of all is that Cronenworth has never had major consistency problems that have been exposed against right-handed pitchers. In fact, he is coming off a couple of seasons in which he averaged a 120 wRC+, and he is still a hitter who has outperformed the league over his career in this split. So this creates a major contradiction. What has caused such an unexpected collapse in Cronenworth’s profile, and how can he solve it? To start, it is true that he is striking out like never before in his career, but he is only 2.5 percentage points above the league average. He is still walking (10.8 BB%) at a rate close to the average (10.0) and remains above that standard in HardHit% (35.9). So, we have to go a little deeper to discover where the real breakdown is in Cronenworth’s swing and how opponents are limiting him. As usual, this story starts with fastballs. Opponents are using them 66.9% of the time, the second-highest percentage of his career behind the 69.6% from 2024. In other words, the rest of the pitches, between a litany breaking balls and off-speed pitches, represent about one-third of what he's seeing. This is what happened when I separated both groups and mixed in some key metrics for power, plate discipline and swing evaluation. Group K% xSLG xwOBA BABIP Whiff% Hard Hit% Ideal Attack Angle % Fastballs 14.3 .412 .362 .284 13.2 44.3 28.5 Not Fastballs 37.8 .207 .180 .261 40.4 19.1 44.6 Difference -23.5 .205 .182 .023 -27.2 25.2 -16.1 *Note: The statistics include all pitch types that were recorded at least five times.* As expected, there are several interesting trends here. Within the chaos, Cronenworth has continued to take advantage of fastballs. Even with a 16.1-point drop in Ideal Attack Angle%, he has managed to produce a .284 BABIP. He is striking out 23.5 percentage points less, has eliminated a large amount of Whiffs%, while sustaining a similar increase in Hard Hit% and double the xSLG and xwOBA, respectively. In other words, when you analyze Cronenworth only against right-handed pitchers’ fastballs, the story does not look nearly as chaotic. Quite the opposite, in fact, as it appears when we look the other way: all the pitches that are not fastballs. You can clearly see that BABIP is the only point where Cronenworth’s contact ability still makes a difference. Here we have the graphical comparison of Cronenworth against right-handers’ fastballs (left) and the rest of the pitches from righties (right). Notice how blue dominates the whiff rates against fastballs. There are no misses in the lower portions of the middle to the outer part. The biggest problems appear in the upper-third outside the strike zone and down and in. Those are pitches Cronenworth could stop chasing if he improves his plate discipline. Even so, check the expected averages on the right. His swing can still handle the fastball in the strike zone, and he can crush pitches on the inner part of the plate. Everything would be very different within this slump if he only had to face fastballs. But the game is much more challenging, and pitchers know where to look for weaknesses. And, you know, it all starts with a choice. Cronenworth is chasing too many pitches outside the strike zone. Unlike fastballs, he does not have problems when the rest of the offerings hang up high in the strike zone. His best xBA marks remain in similar areas where he has also punished fastballs. But there is a point here that I find even more revealing and that could be a key piece of this puzzle: Cronenworth is averaging 44.6% in Ideal Attack Angle. That is 16.1 percentage points higher than his swing against fastballs. But here is a difference we cannot overlook: the exit velocity on his batted balls is lower, at just 84.3 mph. If you're not hitting the ball hard... well, it doesn't really matter at what angle you strike it, does it? This is going to require a multitude of changes to fix, which means that this problem likely can't be solved during the middle of a playoff push. Cronenworth hasn't completely lost his way at the plate, but as right-handed pitchers continue to expose his weakness against the soft stuff, he's going to have to feast on the steady diet of fastballs he's receiving to salvage his season. View full article

Xander Bogaerts is having the worst offensive season of his career. At 33 years old, he is hitting .221/.316/.324 with an 85 wRC+ for the San Diego Padres. Those are the lowest outputs among his full seasons since he posted an 81 wRC+ and 0.1 fWAR in 2014, his first season as a starter with the Red Sox. However, there is a question that sounds more interesting than why he's got such a low average: How can a hitter maintain one of the best disciplines in the league and, at the same time, become a much less productive version of himself? When exploring Bogaerts’ profile, it is clear that the reason for his inconsistency is not his plate discipline. His O-Swing% of 23.1% ranks in the 89th percentile of MLB. His BB% increased from 8.2% in 2025 to 11.9% this year, and his swing rate has barely changed, from 41.9% to 41.7%. Bogaerts is still generating hard contact, but that contact is no longer producing the same value. His 39.8% Hard-Hit rate does not support the offensive decline, as that's his best mark since 2021 (43.0%). However, the expected averages bring us much closer to the root of the collapse. His .247 xBA and .374 xSLG this year are his worst marks since 2017, when he had also posted the lowest levels of his career up to that point. Once we break down those expected averages, we get to where we wanted to be. And, to answer your biggest question, no fastballs have not been the culprits stopping Bogaerts’ swing. His hands are still skilled at attacking velocity on time and producing quality at-bats. Against fastballs, he is averaging a .442 xSLG, the highest of his career since 2021. He has produced a .395 xwOBA, .518 xSLG and 46.3% Hard-Hit% against the four-seam. His Whiff% against fastballs is just 13.6%. The challenge he has not been able to solve appears when pitchers mix breaking pitches and off-speed pitches. During his last four years with the Red Sox, when Bogaerts built a profile that made him one of the most complete shortstops in MLB, you could still see the gap between his ability to destroy fastballs and the breakdowns that appeared against the rest of the pitches. When he arrived in San Diego in 2023, that profile improved significantly, but since then Bogaerts has not been able to sustain it. By comparing his performance across these three periods, we can see where the inconsistencies that have now reached a concerning point began to appear: Xander Bogaerts vs. Breaking & Off-speed Pitches PERIOD Pitch% PA BABIP xwOBA xBA xSLG Swing-miss% Barrel/BBE% 2019-2022 43.3 885 .318 .298 .229 .364 32.8 6.8 2023-2026 44.6 889 .302 .287 .233 .352 30.0 5.5 2026 45 181 .234 .251 .200 .275 34.2 3.5 As you already know, the period between 2019 and 2022 covers Bogaerts’ final four years in Boston. The next one covers his first four years in San Diego, and then we have 2026. The most concerning decline appears in everything related to offensive production, especially in xwOBA and xSLG, while BABIP has also fallen considerably. But expected stats aren't enough. So I made sure to go a little deeper. I explored how Bogaerts’ swing impacted every part of the strike zone, and it is evident that his production was much more complete during his final four seasons in Boston. xwOBA 2019-2022 vs. Breaking & Off-speed Pitches xwOBA 2023-2026 vs. Breaking & Off-speed Pitches In Boston, he had just one weak point inside the strike zone: a .241 xwOBA in the lower corner, curiously the same mark he has had during this stretch with the Padres. Most of the notable differences appear in what he stopped producing with his swing against pitches down in the zone. And that is where the 2026 chart changes the story. This year, Bogaerts has been able to produce above-average results in only one quadrant inside the strike zone and, surprisingly, it's when he reaches for pitches high outside of it. If you have followed Bogaerts for some time, you know that he loves to swing at the first pitch. This year, his 24.2% rate is the highest of his career in that situation, and he has gotten some good dividends from it, with a .909 OPS, his best mark since 2021. And yet, that efficiency has also not been able to appear against the mix of breaking pitches and off-speed pitches, where he has produced just a .209 xBA and .228 xSLG. Bogaerts still knows which pitch he wants to attack. The problem is that, increasingly, finding it no longer guarantees that he can do damage with it. As long as he's got flaws in his swing that are this exploitable, the Padres are going to have to find a way to navigate around a black hole in their lineup. View full article

Let’s be clear: Jackson Merrill did not rescue his season through luck or a sudden burst of bat speed. In fact, his first-half bat speed was 71.3 mph, the same figure he's posting during his subsequent breakout. What has changed is a decision about space and timing; Merrill understood that the problem was not how fast he moved the bat, but where on the plate he was delivering the barrel. To understand the adjustment, we have to look at how the league tried to neutralize him from the start. Opposing pitchers identified a pattern and threw him a clear combination of velocity and horizontal movement. The plan was straightforward: consistently fill the middle and outer portion of the hitting zone. This first Baseball Savant heat map shows that strategy perfectly. Pitch density clustered in the heart of the plate and along the outer half. Merrill entered the zone with an average attack angle of just 6°, an overly flat swing plane. Against pitches over the middle or away from his body, that lack of lift left him with almost no margin for impact. When he made contact, the ball came off softly toward the infield or died without elevation. Against the primary five pitches he saw (sweeper, fastball, cutter, slider and sinker), the result was a costly 26.4% whiff rate, a 25.8% strikeout rate and an average exit velocity of 89.6 mph. Pitchers did not need to hide the ball from him; they simply needed to throw over the plate, knowing his mechanics would not generate much damage. With a diagnosis like that, the solution at the major-league level is not to make the swing more violent in an attempt to pull the ball. It is about syncing up. Merrill kept the structure of his swing intact but moved his contact point a few inches farther out in front of him. By getting to the ball before it traveled deeper into the zone, his rate of ideal attack angle against that same pitch combination jumped from 43.4% to 51.4%. That allowed the barrel to work on an upward path at precisely the moment of impact. This will sound like ninth grade all over again, but it really did just require a change in geometry. Merrill's new attack has dismantled the opposition’s plan. As the second graphic shows, the league has tried to respond. Pitchers began targeting the upper and outer part of the zone, trying to get the ball above his new contact plane. But those elevated pitches along the far edge were no longer finding the late bat that had defined the beginning of his season. By reaching the contact point on time and with the right amount of lift, Merrill turned pitches in that area into his primary source of extra-base damage. Against the same group of pitches that had handcuffed him early, his average exit velocity jumped to 95.1 mph, his barrel rate went from 11.2% to 23.6%, and his expected slugging percentage reached a devastating .739. Against 263 pitches of those types during the second half, he has hit six home runs, nearly matching the nine he needed more than 1,100 pitches to produce at the beginning of the season. At the highest level of baseball, an adjustment is never permanent; it is simply a window of time in which the hitter gains the upper hand. By moving his contact point farther out in the second half, Jackson Merrill neutralized the plan the league had used to contain him. Now, the pressure is back on the pitchers, who have to find a new answer. View full article