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Randy Holt

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  1. Michael King got his pitch count in order on Sunday. Much to the chagrin of the Colorado Rockies. On Sunday, coming off two consecutive shutouts, the San Diego Padres sent their de facto ace to the mound aiming for a sweep of their division rivals. And while the assumption should have been that they'd complete the sweep with Michael King on the mound, his three previous starts had been laborious enough to wonder exactly what it'd look like. On Opening Day against Atlanta, King made it through 76 pitches in 2 2/3 innings, allowing four hits and four walks that led to three earned runs. He followed that up with a 5 2/3-innings, three-earned-run start against the Athletics (101 pitches) and a clean five innings against Cleveland (88 pitches). That's 13 1/3 innings of work that featured 265 pitches. In other words, King has averaged a shade over 20 pitches per inning this year. It's not as if he was running up high strikeout numbers in all three starts, either. He did strike out 11 against the A's, but combined for just five in the other two starts against seven walks (six of them in the bookending starts prior to Sunday). Not that it had a negative bearing on the outcome; the Padres won all three starts. But there was a clear efficiency issue holding King back from working deeper into games. Efficiency turned out to not be an issue for King on Sunday, however. He went the distance, finishing with 110 pitches across nine innings. King surrendered just two hits and one walk, striking out eight in the outing. Had he been able to work faster in the ninth, he could've been in line for a Maddux. While a complete game shutout is a rarity in today's game structure — and thus worthy of merit on its own — the efficiency is the most important element out of all of this. And that starts with strike one. Prior to Sunday, King's first strike rate this year was down almost 10 percentage points. He'd been at 66.1% a year ago; it was only 56.5% through his first three starts this year. That's not only down from his first season in San Diego, but down about eight percentage points from his career mark (64.8%). The worst of the bunch came against Cleveland, when he found the zone on the first pitch only 47.4% of the time. Not an issue on Sunday. Against the Rox, King came in at 69.0%, and for the first time this season, King was on his four-seam to open up counts: King was able to get ahead with the four-seam and then move to the changeup in 0-1 counts. Being deliberate with those two pitches allowed him to be more free in deploying the sinker in different contexts and to mix in the sweeper occasionally. Given how much we've seen him struggle with efficiency, the work early in counts proved to be much more ideal in this outing than the others. That leads us to the other encouraging component: the usage. Back on April 7th, Davy Andrews wrote on King's evolving pitch shapes. The oversimplified version of the piece is that a change in arm angle is in the process of changing the shape and quality of his pitches. The four-seam and changeup are beneficiaries of this; the sweeper less so. King's three most-used pitches on Sunday? Four-seam (26%), changeup (26%), and sinker (23%). The sweeper came in at 18%. We hadn't seen the pitch take a clear backseat through any of King's first three starts. This stands as an encouraging sign. Not that we're advocating for King abandoning the pitch altogether. That he was able to generate whiffs on it 44 percent of the time would indicate that there's an efficient strategy to be deployed here: use the other offerings to fill in and around the zone before knocking them over with the sweeper. Ultimately, King's game is still evolving. That evolution likely includes usage issues — and likely sacrificing some efficiency — as pitches take shape early in the season. But Sunday was a positive step forward, regardless of opponent. The arsenal is gaining more clarity, and if there's one thing opposing hitters don't want, that's probably it. View full article
  2. On Sunday, coming off two consecutive shutouts, the San Diego Padres sent their de facto ace to the mound aiming for a sweep of their division rivals. And while the assumption should have been that they'd complete the sweep with Michael King on the mound, his three previous starts had been laborious enough to wonder exactly what it'd look like. On Opening Day against Atlanta, King made it through 76 pitches in 2 2/3 innings, allowing four hits and four walks that led to three earned runs. He followed that up with a 5 2/3-innings, three-earned-run start against the Athletics (101 pitches) and a clean five innings against Cleveland (88 pitches). That's 13 1/3 innings of work that featured 265 pitches. In other words, King has averaged a shade over 20 pitches per inning this year. It's not as if he was running up high strikeout numbers in all three starts, either. He did strike out 11 against the A's, but combined for just five in the other two starts against seven walks (six of them in the bookending starts prior to Sunday). Not that it had a negative bearing on the outcome; the Padres won all three starts. But there was a clear efficiency issue holding King back from working deeper into games. Efficiency turned out to not be an issue for King on Sunday, however. He went the distance, finishing with 110 pitches across nine innings. King surrendered just two hits and one walk, striking out eight in the outing. Had he been able to work faster in the ninth, he could've been in line for a Maddux. While a complete game shutout is a rarity in today's game structure — and thus worthy of merit on its own — the efficiency is the most important element out of all of this. And that starts with strike one. Prior to Sunday, King's first strike rate this year was down almost 10 percentage points. He'd been at 66.1% a year ago; it was only 56.5% through his first three starts this year. That's not only down from his first season in San Diego, but down about eight percentage points from his career mark (64.8%). The worst of the bunch came against Cleveland, when he found the zone on the first pitch only 47.4% of the time. Not an issue on Sunday. Against the Rox, King came in at 69.0%, and for the first time this season, King was on his four-seam to open up counts: King was able to get ahead with the four-seam and then move to the changeup in 0-1 counts. Being deliberate with those two pitches allowed him to be more free in deploying the sinker in different contexts and to mix in the sweeper occasionally. Given how much we've seen him struggle with efficiency, the work early in counts proved to be much more ideal in this outing than the others. That leads us to the other encouraging component: the usage. Back on April 7th, Davy Andrews wrote on King's evolving pitch shapes. The oversimplified version of the piece is that a change in arm angle is in the process of changing the shape and quality of his pitches. The four-seam and changeup are beneficiaries of this; the sweeper less so. King's three most-used pitches on Sunday? Four-seam (26%), changeup (26%), and sinker (23%). The sweeper came in at 18%. We hadn't seen the pitch take a clear backseat through any of King's first three starts. This stands as an encouraging sign. Not that we're advocating for King abandoning the pitch altogether. That he was able to generate whiffs on it 44 percent of the time would indicate that there's an efficient strategy to be deployed here: use the other offerings to fill in and around the zone before knocking them over with the sweeper. Ultimately, King's game is still evolving. That evolution likely includes usage issues — and likely sacrificing some efficiency — as pitches take shape early in the season. But Sunday was a positive step forward, regardless of opponent. The arsenal is gaining more clarity, and if there's one thing opposing hitters don't want, that's probably it.
  3. Kyle Hart's first start back stateside was varying levels of fine. He tossed five innings against Cleveland, allowing a pair of runs and working ar ound a lot of hard contact (57.1% hard-hit rate). Hart's second outing was downright bad, as he failed to make it out of the first inning against the Chicago Cubs in a disastrous outing wrought by poor command (four walks in two-thirds of an inning). Start no. 3, however, could be a sign of some traction for the former KBO pitcher. Against the Rox on Saturday night, Hart's line included six innings, one hit, zero walks, and four strikeouts. It was what both Hart and the Padres needed given a quiet night from the offense. And while it's easy to declare that the outing came against one of the league's worst offenses (collective 69 wRC+), that might be an oversimplification. In a general sense, the command was much better. Hart's start against the Cubs last weekend included just 39 pitches before he was yanked. Only 18 of those were strikes. He didn't generate a single whiff and couldn't find the zone with any consistency. But on Saturday against Colorado, Hart reined it in to a pretty astonishing extent. He threw 74 pitches this time around, with 49 of them landing for strikes. That's a 66.2% strike rate after just 46.2% last weekend. Even more notable is the fact that his percentage of first strikes skyrocketed; he averaged only 39.8% in his first two starts before going for a 68.4% percent clip on Saturday. The broadcast on Saturday noted that Hart's mechanics looked more in sync. Specifically, his frontside coming down more firmly than it had in his last start was attributed as a predominant factor in his ability to locate his pitches. He was a bit more over the top than horizontal as well, allowing him to realize much of the same success that he did in his first start against the Guardians. Hart's usage might have something to do with the effectiveness as well: Hart's sweeper is his best pitch. Full stop. It's the pitch with which he's avoided hard contact to the highest degree. It's the pitch that Hart needs to utilize in order to be effective, given that he's not going to generate a high volume of whiffs to begin with. In deploying the sweeper to the extent he did on Saturday (36%), he generated a called strike and whiff rate (CSW%) of 44.0% against the Rockies. No other pitch was close to that mark. With an ability to locate the sweeper, Hart could play his other pitches off it. Against the Cubs last weekend, the sweeper and fastball were used equally, with only the sinker factoring in regularly among his other offerings. While those three were his most frequently thrown pitches again on Saturday, he was also able to mix in the change and slider to more effect. Those two averaged his lowest average exit velocity against this side of the sweeper. It'll be interesting to see how that command and pitch mix holds up against an opponent of higher quality. While too simple for an explanation of his success on Saturday, it's still a factor. The good news for Hart is that his next projected start comes next weekend against Houston. The Astros currently carry a team wRC+ of just 84 (23rd), with middle-tier contact quality and almost no power to speak of (.101 ISO as a team). Beyond that, Hart projects to go against Tampa Bay. While both better than Colorado in a handful of ways, neither is among the league's higher-end offensive groups. That should, ideally, allow Hart to settle in further and springboard that command into the summer months.
  4. Nothing remedies a clunky start to the year like an outing against the Colorado Rockies. Kyle Hart's first start back stateside was varying levels of fine. He tossed five innings against Cleveland, allowing a pair of runs and working ar ound a lot of hard contact (57.1% hard-hit rate). Hart's second outing was downright bad, as he failed to make it out of the first inning against the Chicago Cubs in a disastrous outing wrought by poor command (four walks in two-thirds of an inning). Start no. 3, however, could be a sign of some traction for the former KBO pitcher. Against the Rox on Saturday night, Hart's line included six innings, one hit, zero walks, and four strikeouts. It was what both Hart and the Padres needed given a quiet night from the offense. And while it's easy to declare that the outing came against one of the league's worst offenses (collective 69 wRC+), that might be an oversimplification. In a general sense, the command was much better. Hart's start against the Cubs last weekend included just 39 pitches before he was yanked. Only 18 of those were strikes. He didn't generate a single whiff and couldn't find the zone with any consistency. But on Saturday against Colorado, Hart reined it in to a pretty astonishing extent. He threw 74 pitches this time around, with 49 of them landing for strikes. That's a 66.2% strike rate after just 46.2% last weekend. Even more notable is the fact that his percentage of first strikes skyrocketed; he averaged only 39.8% in his first two starts before going for a 68.4% percent clip on Saturday. The broadcast on Saturday noted that Hart's mechanics looked more in sync. Specifically, his frontside coming down more firmly than it had in his last start was attributed as a predominant factor in his ability to locate his pitches. He was a bit more over the top than horizontal as well, allowing him to realize much of the same success that he did in his first start against the Guardians. Hart's usage might have something to do with the effectiveness as well: Hart's sweeper is his best pitch. Full stop. It's the pitch with which he's avoided hard contact to the highest degree. It's the pitch that Hart needs to utilize in order to be effective, given that he's not going to generate a high volume of whiffs to begin with. In deploying the sweeper to the extent he did on Saturday (36%), he generated a called strike and whiff rate (CSW%) of 44.0% against the Rockies. No other pitch was close to that mark. With an ability to locate the sweeper, Hart could play his other pitches off it. Against the Cubs last weekend, the sweeper and fastball were used equally, with only the sinker factoring in regularly among his other offerings. While those three were his most frequently thrown pitches again on Saturday, he was also able to mix in the change and slider to more effect. Those two averaged his lowest average exit velocity against this side of the sweeper. It'll be interesting to see how that command and pitch mix holds up against an opponent of higher quality. While too simple for an explanation of his success on Saturday, it's still a factor. The good news for Hart is that his next projected start comes next weekend against Houston. The Astros currently carry a team wRC+ of just 84 (23rd), with middle-tier contact quality and almost no power to speak of (.101 ISO as a team). Beyond that, Hart projects to go against Tampa Bay. While both better than Colorado in a handful of ways, neither is among the league's higher-end offensive groups. That should, ideally, allow Hart to settle in further and springboard that command into the summer months. View full article
  5. After starting off a scorching 7-0, the Friars' fortunes came to a halt at a brisk Wrigley Field over the weekend. They lost two of three to the Chicago Cubs before heading back out west. While they were able to claim a pair from the West Sacramento Athletics, they didn't come through remotely unscathed. The series began with Jackson Merrill being placed on the injured list with a hamstring strain. Merrill sat out the series opener in Sacramento on Monday before being placed on the IL on Tuesday. The team isn't expecting him to miss much more than the minimum 10 days, if even beyond that threshold. Nonetheless, it puts a damper on his excellent start and the nine-year extension he signed last week. Worse yet, a big loss to the A's on Tuesday night saw Jake Cronenworth and Fernando Tatis Jr. leave with injuries. Cronenworth experienced cramping in his ribs coming off a hit by pitch on Sunday. Tatis tweaked his shoulder on an awkward-looking swing and further aggravated it on a slide to third. Neither player was in the lineup for the series finale on Wednesday afternoon. But neither expressed concern, either. Tatis explicitly stated he'll avoid an IL trip of his own; Cronenworth expects to be in the lineup on Friday. The Padres have a day off Thursday. While it's a massively positive outcome — really, on all three counts — the scare really underscores the lack of depth throughout the big league ranks for the Padres. Tatis and Merrill were both off to as good a start as any position player in the league. Both players sit at 0.7 fWAR, putting them among the league leaders in a small sample. By wRC+, they're the team's two best hitters, with Merrill at 202 and Tatis at 175. Cronenworth sits third at 159. Together, they represent the biggest impact of the team's current roster. Merrill's ISO is at .297 and Cronenworth's is .229. Those are the two highest isolated slugging marks on the team. When you remove that level of impact from any big league roster, there are going to be questions. But those questions loom even larger for a Padres team visibly lacking in lineup depth, both on the current roster and in the minor league ranks. Sure, Manny Machado is off to a strong start (142 wRC+). But he's the final piece of this top-heavy puzzle. When you start to look past him, the picture gets murkier. Luis Arráez is wRC+'ing 118, but needed a stretch of 11 hits in four games to get there. Prior to that, he had only four hits across eight games. Gavin Sheets looks like the ideal change-of-scenery guy (143 wRC+), but he's also hitting almost exclusively against right-handed pitching. Xander Bogaerts is exactly average by wRC+ but has demonstrated virtually zero power to date. From there, it's a smattering of platoon and bench options. Martín Maldonado and Elias Díaz. Jason Heyward and Brandon Lockridge. Jose Iglesias. Yuli Gurriel. Of the team's collection of stopgap, non-roster invite types, only Sheets has demonstrated the ability to provide consistent offense. And that's in a super defined — and as such quite limited — role. The departures of players like Ha-Seong Kim, Jurickson Profar (current suspension notwithstanding), and even Kyle Higashioka removed a massive chunk of the supplementary offense. In the system, it's difficult to see where the offense could come from down the line. Each of (recently recalled) Oscar Gonzalez and Luis Campusano are off to strong starts in El Paso, but neither has shown the ability to be anything resembling consistent at the top level. Maybe Tirso Ornelas gets a shot at a bench gig. Maybe Connor Joe does. Ultimately, though, it's not as if stability is to be found elsewhere within the organization should the worst transpire. Luckily for the Padres, the worst has not, in fact, transpired at this point. Tatis and Cronenworth were able to avoid IL stints entirely, while Merrill's should only hold him out within range of that 10-day mark. The team, top-heavy though it may be, is in fairly good shape. But when you've got a series of scares like the team has had this week, you start taking stock of some things. And while it's not a surprise, down the bench and into the system isn't in great shape for an "in case of emergency" situation.
  6. The vibes were incredible for the San Diego Padres in Week 1 of the 2025 Major League season. Less so in Week 2. After starting off a scorching 7-0, the Friars' fortunes came to a halt at a brisk Wrigley Field over the weekend. They lost two of three to the Chicago Cubs before heading back out west. While they were able to claim a pair from the West Sacramento Athletics, they didn't come through remotely unscathed. The series began with Jackson Merrill being placed on the injured list with a hamstring strain. Merrill sat out the series opener in Sacramento on Monday before being placed on the IL on Tuesday. The team isn't expecting him to miss much more than the minimum 10 days, if even beyond that threshold. Nonetheless, it puts a damper on his excellent start and the nine-year extension he signed last week. Worse yet, a big loss to the A's on Tuesday night saw Jake Cronenworth and Fernando Tatis Jr. leave with injuries. Cronenworth experienced cramping in his ribs coming off a hit by pitch on Sunday. Tatis tweaked his shoulder on an awkward-looking swing and further aggravated it on a slide to third. Neither player was in the lineup for the series finale on Wednesday afternoon. But neither expressed concern, either. Tatis explicitly stated he'll avoid an IL trip of his own; Cronenworth expects to be in the lineup on Friday. The Padres have a day off Thursday. While it's a massively positive outcome — really, on all three counts — the scare really underscores the lack of depth throughout the big league ranks for the Padres. Tatis and Merrill were both off to as good a start as any position player in the league. Both players sit at 0.7 fWAR, putting them among the league leaders in a small sample. By wRC+, they're the team's two best hitters, with Merrill at 202 and Tatis at 175. Cronenworth sits third at 159. Together, they represent the biggest impact of the team's current roster. Merrill's ISO is at .297 and Cronenworth's is .229. Those are the two highest isolated slugging marks on the team. When you remove that level of impact from any big league roster, there are going to be questions. But those questions loom even larger for a Padres team visibly lacking in lineup depth, both on the current roster and in the minor league ranks. Sure, Manny Machado is off to a strong start (142 wRC+). But he's the final piece of this top-heavy puzzle. When you start to look past him, the picture gets murkier. Luis Arráez is wRC+'ing 118, but needed a stretch of 11 hits in four games to get there. Prior to that, he had only four hits across eight games. Gavin Sheets looks like the ideal change-of-scenery guy (143 wRC+), but he's also hitting almost exclusively against right-handed pitching. Xander Bogaerts is exactly average by wRC+ but has demonstrated virtually zero power to date. From there, it's a smattering of platoon and bench options. Martín Maldonado and Elias Díaz. Jason Heyward and Brandon Lockridge. Jose Iglesias. Yuli Gurriel. Of the team's collection of stopgap, non-roster invite types, only Sheets has demonstrated the ability to provide consistent offense. And that's in a super defined — and as such quite limited — role. The departures of players like Ha-Seong Kim, Jurickson Profar (current suspension notwithstanding), and even Kyle Higashioka removed a massive chunk of the supplementary offense. In the system, it's difficult to see where the offense could come from down the line. Each of (recently recalled) Oscar Gonzalez and Luis Campusano are off to strong starts in El Paso, but neither has shown the ability to be anything resembling consistent at the top level. Maybe Tirso Ornelas gets a shot at a bench gig. Maybe Connor Joe does. Ultimately, though, it's not as if stability is to be found elsewhere within the organization should the worst transpire. Luckily for the Padres, the worst has not, in fact, transpired at this point. Tatis and Cronenworth were able to avoid IL stints entirely, while Merrill's should only hold him out within range of that 10-day mark. The team, top-heavy though it may be, is in fairly good shape. But when you've got a series of scares like the team has had this week, you start taking stock of some things. And while it's not a surprise, down the bench and into the system isn't in great shape for an "in case of emergency" situation. View full article
  7. A former prospect of the Chicago Cubs as far back as 2017, Jeremiah Estrada broke out in 2022 courtesy of a 1.30 ERA across three levels of the minor leagues. That performance earned him a cup of coffee and five big league innings before another dozen appearances in 2023. The latter year didn't favor him nearly as much. His command slipped and the Cubs designated him for assignment by early November. The Padres claimed Estrada off waivers four days after his DFA, and Estrada latched onto a regular relief role last year. He didn't just hold onto a roster spot but thrived across 62 appearances and 61 innings in San Diego. He would go on to post a 37.3% strikeout rate, a 9.1% walk rate, and a 2.07 ERA, emerging as a key part one of the better relief groups in the league. Estrada became something of a sensation courtesy of his "chitter." A hybrid pitch that features a Vulcan grip and characteristics of a splitter and changeup, Estrada began throwing the pitch last year. The Cubs had attempted to get him to throw a splitter, but he was unable to get comfortable throwing it. With the Padres, the chitter was born. Because there's only so many times you can use the word "chitter," we'll refer to the pitch as his splitter moving forward (also because that's how Baseball Savant classifies it). And while Estrada's splitter only accounted for 19.8% of his pitches last year, its 51.8% whiff rate was the best among his pitches by more than nearly 20 percentage points. As Estrada adjusted to throwing the pitch, though, he remained primarily a fastball-slider guy. Clearly, given the numbers above and his increasingly crucial role as the season wore on, that worked for him. This year, however, we've already seen a deviation in his usage from a year ago. The possibility that we'd see the splitter more frequently deployed in conjunction with his fastball and slider always existed. But that hasn't been the case. Instead, Estrada has virtually ditched his slider in favor of the splitter as his no. 2 pitch: The rise for the splitter hasn't been tremendous on its own. The pitch is up to 22.6% usage, but when you combine it with the steep drop in his throwing of the slider, his aim starts to become fairly clear. The slider is being thrown just 6.5% of the time this year (with a notable 100% percent whiff rate in those rare instances). While the slider was an effective tool for Estrada, it also wasn't an out pitch in the way that we might expect for a two-pitch reliever. He generated a 52.9% groundball rate with it, but there was no discernible difference between the slider and his other offerings in terms of average exit velocity, chase rate, or movement. It just wasn't doing the things you'd really expect a slider to do in terms of outcomes. Given how much more effective the splitter was than the slider last season, the shift in usage is logical. Adding to the logic is the fact that he was able to hold opposing hitters to the lowest hard-hit rate (25.0%) among his three primary offerings with that pitch, while generating the highest whiff rate. But with the flip from slider to splitter, an interesting trend has started to emerge. For one, Estrada hasn't generated a single chase with the split. He hasn't garnered one groundball (with the splitter or any other pitch type). There also isn't any hard contact to speak of against his non-fastball pitches. A quick peek at the zone profile tells us what we need to know, though: It's too early to know whether this is intentional, but through his first handful of appearances, Estrada is working up in the zone more often. He worked all four corners last year, especially when the slider was involved. Now, it's almost as if he's taking on a plan of attack not unlike Shōta Imanaga in Chicago. It can be effective when properly executed. And it certainly looks as if Estrada's up to the challenge thus far. With the fastball, he's been able to generate popups exactly half the time; with the splitter he's getting fly ball contact at a full 100% clip. Hard contact hardly matters (and barely exists) on a popup and the soft contact induced by the splitter minimizes the danger pretty drastically. Estrada has also been inside the zone on 50% of each pitch type. Hitters are going to feel compelled to swing when you're working inside the zone that frequently, and that could be to his benefit as long as the precision remains. We're not foolish enough to think that the command will always be precise enough to make this a surefire strategy. It's also much too early in the season to know if this is even intentional; Estrada has only made five appearances as of this writing. But a .080 expected batting average with zero barrels kind of speaks for itelf. The usage and its connection to the early outcomes, though, are fascinating. Not fascinating enough for an adjustment, mind you. Once the weather warms, fastball-splitter becomes a more dangerous combination in the upper parts of the zone. Whether the new pitch mix is permanent, whether the slider gets more involved again, and whether we Estrada go back to working the edges and outside of the zone more frequently — these will all be important considerations as the season progresses.
  8. Ahead of the 2024 season, Jeremiah Estrada was a two-pitch reliever with barely more than 15 big league innings to his name. A year later, he's still a two-pitch reliever. But the pitches — and the volume — have changed. A former prospect of the Chicago Cubs as far back as 2017, Jeremiah Estrada broke out in 2022 courtesy of a 1.30 ERA across three levels of the minor leagues. That performance earned him a cup of coffee and five big league innings before another dozen appearances in 2023. The latter year didn't favor him nearly as much. His command slipped and the Cubs designated him for assignment by early November. The Padres claimed Estrada off waivers four days after his DFA, and Estrada latched onto a regular relief role last year. He didn't just hold onto a roster spot but thrived across 62 appearances and 61 innings in San Diego. He would go on to post a 37.3% strikeout rate, a 9.1% walk rate, and a 2.07 ERA, emerging as a key part one of the better relief groups in the league. Estrada became something of a sensation courtesy of his "chitter." A hybrid pitch that features a Vulcan grip and characteristics of a splitter and changeup, Estrada began throwing the pitch last year. The Cubs had attempted to get him to throw a splitter, but he was unable to get comfortable throwing it. With the Padres, the chitter was born. Because there's only so many times you can use the word "chitter," we'll refer to the pitch as his splitter moving forward (also because that's how Baseball Savant classifies it). And while Estrada's splitter only accounted for 19.8% of his pitches last year, its 51.8% whiff rate was the best among his pitches by more than nearly 20 percentage points. As Estrada adjusted to throwing the pitch, though, he remained primarily a fastball-slider guy. Clearly, given the numbers above and his increasingly crucial role as the season wore on, that worked for him. This year, however, we've already seen a deviation in his usage from a year ago. The possibility that we'd see the splitter more frequently deployed in conjunction with his fastball and slider always existed. But that hasn't been the case. Instead, Estrada has virtually ditched his slider in favor of the splitter as his no. 2 pitch: The rise for the splitter hasn't been tremendous on its own. The pitch is up to 22.6% usage, but when you combine it with the steep drop in his throwing of the slider, his aim starts to become fairly clear. The slider is being thrown just 6.5% of the time this year (with a notable 100% percent whiff rate in those rare instances). While the slider was an effective tool for Estrada, it also wasn't an out pitch in the way that we might expect for a two-pitch reliever. He generated a 52.9% groundball rate with it, but there was no discernible difference between the slider and his other offerings in terms of average exit velocity, chase rate, or movement. It just wasn't doing the things you'd really expect a slider to do in terms of outcomes. Given how much more effective the splitter was than the slider last season, the shift in usage is logical. Adding to the logic is the fact that he was able to hold opposing hitters to the lowest hard-hit rate (25.0%) among his three primary offerings with that pitch, while generating the highest whiff rate. But with the flip from slider to splitter, an interesting trend has started to emerge. For one, Estrada hasn't generated a single chase with the split. He hasn't garnered one groundball (with the splitter or any other pitch type). There also isn't any hard contact to speak of against his non-fastball pitches. A quick peek at the zone profile tells us what we need to know, though: It's too early to know whether this is intentional, but through his first handful of appearances, Estrada is working up in the zone more often. He worked all four corners last year, especially when the slider was involved. Now, it's almost as if he's taking on a plan of attack not unlike Shōta Imanaga in Chicago. It can be effective when properly executed. And it certainly looks as if Estrada's up to the challenge thus far. With the fastball, he's been able to generate popups exactly half the time; with the splitter he's getting fly ball contact at a full 100% clip. Hard contact hardly matters (and barely exists) on a popup and the soft contact induced by the splitter minimizes the danger pretty drastically. Estrada has also been inside the zone on 50% of each pitch type. Hitters are going to feel compelled to swing when you're working inside the zone that frequently, and that could be to his benefit as long as the precision remains. We're not foolish enough to think that the command will always be precise enough to make this a surefire strategy. It's also much too early in the season to know if this is even intentional; Estrada has only made five appearances as of this writing. But a .080 expected batting average with zero barrels kind of speaks for itelf. The usage and its connection to the early outcomes, though, are fascinating. Not fascinating enough for an adjustment, mind you. Once the weather warms, fastball-splitter becomes a more dangerous combination in the upper parts of the zone. Whether the new pitch mix is permanent, whether the slider gets more involved again, and whether we Estrada go back to working the edges and outside of the zone more frequently — these will all be important considerations as the season progresses. View full article
  9. Despite spending barely a calendar year with the Padres to this point, fans quickly became accustomed to what makes Luis Arráez such a fascinating quantity among big league hitters. He really only does one thing well. The three-time batting champion doesn't hit the ball hard, doesn't hit for power, doesn't walk, doesn't run the bases well, and doesn't play defense. But what does he do? If you're Moneyball-pilled, your instinctive response to that question is "he gets on base." However, even that would be a stretch. Yes, he has a .347 OBP for his career. But this is also a guy who walked at a clip of only 3.6% in 2024 (and is only at 2.6% thus far in 2025). No, our response here is: he puts the bat on the baseball. Since arriving at the top level back in 2019, no player has recorded a higher contact rate than Arráez, who sits at 93.1%. For context, Steven Kwan sits second (91.5%) and former big leaguer David Fletcher ranks third (90.7%). Both have roughly 1,000 fewer plate appearances than Arráez, however. His overall contact rate includes a rate of 95.1% on pitches inside of the strike zone and 88.3% percent on ones outside of it. The latter number is almost 10 percentage points higher than the second-ranked Fletcher. There isn't anything particularly interesting or notable about the approach, either. He sits in roughly the middle of the pack in swing rates of all varieties. He's just exceptional at putting the bat on the baseball. That skill comes despite the following percentile distribution: Poor bat speed. Low barrel rates. Chases pitches. Rarely walks. But doesn't miss and puts the ball on exactly the part of the bat he needs. There are so many things that have pointed to why this skill set shouldn't work. And yet, it has. Every single day since May 18, 2019. Arráez flew out in the first plate appearance of his career. His average at that point was .000. He then doubled and finished the game with a .500 average. It remained the same after a 1-for-2 performance in career game no. 2. For the remainder of the season, the average fluctuated between .332 at the lowest and over .400 at the highest. He finished at a .334 BA across 366 PA for the season. The lowest average Arráez has posted in a season was .294 back in 2021. By then, though, he'd already turned in marks of .334 and .321. so a one-year dip under the .300 threshold wasn't going to touch him. Especially given that he went .316, .354, .314 in the three subsequent seasons. There really isn't anybody doing anything remotely like that these days. As it turns out, Stathead sort of...breaks when you're looking for streaks as long as this. A search into somewhat recent history would spit out Tony Gwynn and Larry Walker as names with comparable streaks hitting over the .300 mark. Names of an even more recent vintage would give you guys like Christian Yelich, Trea Turner, and Joey Votto. As far as the latter names go, each had enough years finishing under the .300 benchmark to pin them down into the .295 range as a career total. Arráez hasn't pushed such a streak far enough to put him at that point for even a single day. It's a pretty wild accomplishment. While batting average obviously doesn't carry the same weight it once did, there's something to be said about the ability to remain over a certain mark for the entirety of one's career. Especially while not doing anything particularly well. And while Arráez isn't off to the best of starts (90 wRC+ to date), he's coming off six hits in two games and has yet to strike out this season. So something is still working. Just as it has each day since May 18, 2019.
  10. On May 18, 2019, current San Diego Padres first baseman Luis Arráez made his big league debut with the Minnesota Twins. He hasn't had a career average under .300 since. Despite spending barely a calendar year with the Padres to this point, fans quickly became accustomed to what makes Luis Arráez such a fascinating quantity among big league hitters. He really only does one thing well. The three-time batting champion doesn't hit the ball hard, doesn't hit for power, doesn't walk, doesn't run the bases well, and doesn't play defense. But what does he do? If you're Moneyball-pilled, your instinctive response to that question is "he gets on base." However, even that would be a stretch. Yes, he has a .347 OBP for his career. But this is also a guy who walked at a clip of only 3.6% in 2024 (and is only at 2.6% thus far in 2025). No, our response here is: he puts the bat on the baseball. Since arriving at the top level back in 2019, no player has recorded a higher contact rate than Arráez, who sits at 93.1%. For context, Steven Kwan sits second (91.5%) and former big leaguer David Fletcher ranks third (90.7%). Both have roughly 1,000 fewer plate appearances than Arráez, however. His overall contact rate includes a rate of 95.1% on pitches inside of the strike zone and 88.3% percent on ones outside of it. The latter number is almost 10 percentage points higher than the second-ranked Fletcher. There isn't anything particularly interesting or notable about the approach, either. He sits in roughly the middle of the pack in swing rates of all varieties. He's just exceptional at putting the bat on the baseball. That skill comes despite the following percentile distribution: Poor bat speed. Low barrel rates. Chases pitches. Rarely walks. But doesn't miss and puts the ball on exactly the part of the bat he needs. There are so many things that have pointed to why this skill set shouldn't work. And yet, it has. Every single day since May 18, 2019. Arráez flew out in the first plate appearance of his career. His average at that point was .000. He then doubled and finished the game with a .500 average. It remained the same after a 1-for-2 performance in career game no. 2. For the remainder of the season, the average fluctuated between .332 at the lowest and over .400 at the highest. He finished at a .334 BA across 366 PA for the season. The lowest average Arráez has posted in a season was .294 back in 2021. By then, though, he'd already turned in marks of .334 and .321. so a one-year dip under the .300 threshold wasn't going to touch him. Especially given that he went .316, .354, .314 in the three subsequent seasons. There really isn't anybody doing anything remotely like that these days. As it turns out, Stathead sort of...breaks when you're looking for streaks as long as this. A search into somewhat recent history would spit out Tony Gwynn and Larry Walker as names with comparable streaks hitting over the .300 mark. Names of an even more recent vintage would give you guys like Christian Yelich, Trea Turner, and Joey Votto. As far as the latter names go, each had enough years finishing under the .300 benchmark to pin them down into the .295 range as a career total. Arráez hasn't pushed such a streak far enough to put him at that point for even a single day. It's a pretty wild accomplishment. While batting average obviously doesn't carry the same weight it once did, there's something to be said about the ability to remain over a certain mark for the entirety of one's career. Especially while not doing anything particularly well. And while Arráez isn't off to the best of starts (90 wRC+ to date), he's coming off six hits in two games and has yet to strike out this season. So something is still working. Just as it has each day since May 18, 2019. View full article
  11. I don't know if you know this, but baseball players are inherently followers. What works for one guy, might not work for another. But you can be darn sure they're going to try that thing that works for that other guy just in case. Which is why it's no surprise that seemingly overnight, the torpedo bat has taken over Major League Baseball. The new-look bat, marked by its bowling pin-like shape, shifts the distribution of the wood within the bat in order to generate more quality contact a little lower down the barrel. It's an area more frequently used by hitters, with those utilizing it at this point hoping to get some stronger gains out of the type of contact they're making. It's been likened to a golfer getting a club fitting, with the new shape not necessarily likely to work for everyone. But given what the Yankees did to the Milwaukee Brewers' staff over the weekend (to say nothing of Elly De La Cruz's two-homer night using it on Monday), the attention is there. At this point, we know it's not entirely new. Former New York Yankees assistant hitting coordinator (and current field coordinator of the Miami Marlins) Aaron Leanhardt is the bulk of the brains behind the new stick, which has designs going back a couple of years. Teams, including the Yankees, Chicago Cubs, and Tampa Bay Rays were doing the research on the impact of the bat before this season. So it makes sense that of the 16 hitters reported to be using the torpedo bat at this time, half of them come from those three teams (and five of them from the Yankees). Given that the realm of sports discussion is, in itself, driven by following the ideas of others, we're likely to continue to hear about the bat's presence quite regularly in the coming months. Especially if a polarizing team like the Yankees continues to slug home runs against pitching staffs held together by duct tape and paper clips. But should the torpedo make its way to San Diego in the near future, the Padres appear to feature the perfect candidate for such a tool. Jason Heyward has long been a frustrating offensive presence to watch. As much as he brings to a team in the defense and intangibles departments, the hitting hasn't been there in a legitimate decade. With the exception of the shortened 2020 and 2023, when he parlayed a minor league deal into a platoon role with the Dodgers, the last above-average season he posted (by wRC+) came with St. Louis back in 2015 (121). There have been various adjustments and retools on the mechanical side, but the swing ultimately produces the same results: plenty of contact, but a lot of it soft and on the ground. Since 2016, Heyward's 81.5% contact rate ranks 120th out of 529 qualified position players. His 49.6% groundball rate ranks 122nd. One of those things is a problem. One of them is not. I'll let you sort which is which. Despite the contact volume, Heyward has not been remotely adept at creating quality contact. There have been some years where he finishes in a reasonable percentile in the hard-hit game (including a 60th percentile finish in 2021 courtesy of a 42.4% hard-hit rate), but barrels have been a particularly difficult puzzle for Heyward to solve. He finished 47th percentile in barrel rate (8.1%) in 2023, but has never been above the 29th in any of the other years throughout the decade. The lack of quality contact comes despite impressive bat speed figures over the course of the last two seasons: Heyward's average bat speed checks in around what is considered a fast swing. One imagines that you'd experience at least some degree of higher quality of contact when you're getting the bat through the zone at the pace at which Heyward clearly is. At the same time, his ideal point of contact leaves something to be desired: The point of contact being almost squarely above the plate is suboptimal. The swing speed helps him to compensate for seemingly late reactions and leads to heavy pull rates (a 50.7% pull rate in the last four seasons alone). Even with his positioning in the back-middle of the box, he's late to the ball and unable to find the barrel with one of the longer average swings among any hitter (he's averaged 8.3 ft against Giancarlo Stanton's league-leading 8.5). The positioning and the bat speed should be ideal. Instead, he's just an apparently late swinger and the barrel almost never has a chance to find the baseball. Which is why he makes so much sense as a torpedo bat candidate. It's not a thing that's going to work for everyone. But it's been especially effective for those who find themselves contacting the ball a little closer to the handle. As Heyward has aged, this has become an increasingly obvious issue within his game. Given the unique blend of approach and contact ability, this is a tool that should fall directly into his wheelhouse. I don't imagine it'll be too long before the torpedo bat starts spreading throughout the western region. And once it's in the Padres clubhouse, I'd be a bit surprised if he wasn't among the first to take a swing.
  12. Heyward's struggles at the plate and his batted ball profile seem like they'd make him a good fit for the new fad. I don't know if you know this, but baseball players are inherently followers. What works for one guy, might not work for another. But you can be darn sure they're going to try that thing that works for that other guy just in case. Which is why it's no surprise that seemingly overnight, the torpedo bat has taken over Major League Baseball. The new-look bat, marked by its bowling pin-like shape, shifts the distribution of the wood within the bat in order to generate more quality contact a little lower down the barrel. It's an area more frequently used by hitters, with those utilizing it at this point hoping to get some stronger gains out of the type of contact they're making. It's been likened to a golfer getting a club fitting, with the new shape not necessarily likely to work for everyone. But given what the Yankees did to the Milwaukee Brewers' staff over the weekend (to say nothing of Elly De La Cruz's two-homer night using it on Monday), the attention is there. At this point, we know it's not entirely new. Former New York Yankees assistant hitting coordinator (and current field coordinator of the Miami Marlins) Aaron Leanhardt is the bulk of the brains behind the new stick, which has designs going back a couple of years. Teams, including the Yankees, Chicago Cubs, and Tampa Bay Rays were doing the research on the impact of the bat before this season. So it makes sense that of the 16 hitters reported to be using the torpedo bat at this time, half of them come from those three teams (and five of them from the Yankees). Given that the realm of sports discussion is, in itself, driven by following the ideas of others, we're likely to continue to hear about the bat's presence quite regularly in the coming months. Especially if a polarizing team like the Yankees continues to slug home runs against pitching staffs held together by duct tape and paper clips. But should the torpedo make its way to San Diego in the near future, the Padres appear to feature the perfect candidate for such a tool. Jason Heyward has long been a frustrating offensive presence to watch. As much as he brings to a team in the defense and intangibles departments, the hitting hasn't been there in a legitimate decade. With the exception of the shortened 2020 and 2023, when he parlayed a minor league deal into a platoon role with the Dodgers, the last above-average season he posted (by wRC+) came with St. Louis back in 2015 (121). There have been various adjustments and retools on the mechanical side, but the swing ultimately produces the same results: plenty of contact, but a lot of it soft and on the ground. Since 2016, Heyward's 81.5% contact rate ranks 120th out of 529 qualified position players. His 49.6% groundball rate ranks 122nd. One of those things is a problem. One of them is not. I'll let you sort which is which. Despite the contact volume, Heyward has not been remotely adept at creating quality contact. There have been some years where he finishes in a reasonable percentile in the hard-hit game (including a 60th percentile finish in 2021 courtesy of a 42.4% hard-hit rate), but barrels have been a particularly difficult puzzle for Heyward to solve. He finished 47th percentile in barrel rate (8.1%) in 2023, but has never been above the 29th in any of the other years throughout the decade. The lack of quality contact comes despite impressive bat speed figures over the course of the last two seasons: Heyward's average bat speed checks in around what is considered a fast swing. One imagines that you'd experience at least some degree of higher quality of contact when you're getting the bat through the zone at the pace at which Heyward clearly is. At the same time, his ideal point of contact leaves something to be desired: The point of contact being almost squarely above the plate is suboptimal. The swing speed helps him to compensate for seemingly late reactions and leads to heavy pull rates (a 50.7% pull rate in the last four seasons alone). Even with his positioning in the back-middle of the box, he's late to the ball and unable to find the barrel with one of the longer average swings among any hitter (he's averaged 8.3 ft against Giancarlo Stanton's league-leading 8.5). The positioning and the bat speed should be ideal. Instead, he's just an apparently late swinger and the barrel almost never has a chance to find the baseball. Which is why he makes so much sense as a torpedo bat candidate. It's not a thing that's going to work for everyone. But it's been especially effective for those who find themselves contacting the ball a little closer to the handle. As Heyward has aged, this has become an increasingly obvious issue within his game. Given the unique blend of approach and contact ability, this is a tool that should fall directly into his wheelhouse. I don't imagine it'll be too long before the torpedo bat starts spreading throughout the western region. And once it's in the Padres clubhouse, I'd be a bit surprised if he wasn't among the first to take a swing. View full article
  13. Not that Jackson Merrill's future was some looming question for the San Diego Padres, but with arbitration eligibility coming after 2026, the team had incentive to try to lock in some cost certainty with their emerging superstar. They have it now, with Merrill and the Padres agreeing to a nine-year contract extension that includes an option for a 10th season in 2035. Efforts to sign Merrill to a long-term pact were not a secret. The Padres had reportedly approached him before his debut about such a deal, similar to what the Milwaukee Brewers did when they signed Jackson Chourio for eight years ahead of his own rookie campaign in 2024. For his own money, Merrill was satisfied waiting but did note that he wanted to remain in San Diego throughout his career. Now, an organization that lacks a certain degree of longer-term certainty locks in a whole lot more of it. There are long-term contracts on the books throughout the roster. Jake Cronenworth is on the books through 2030. Xander Bogaerts and Manny Machado are each signed through 2033. Fernando Tatis Jr. is signed through 2034. On the bump, they've got 38-year-old Yu Darvish for three more seasons and recovering Joe Musgrove for two. But even with a handful of deals set to carry well into the future, it's not an entirely stable situation. It remains to be seen whether Darvish will see that deal through to the end. Cronenworth has been floated in trade rumors. There are questions about Machado's long-term durability and the impact of his swing on his body. And it remains to be seen whether previous payroll constraints will continue to put the clamps on additional spending in the way that we've seen this organization do in years prior. But between Merrill and Tatis, the Padres have two of their younger talents with more upside than anyone on the roster locked down for the foreseeable future. In Merrill's case, they get that cost certainty more than a year ahead of arbitration. Even with various escalators in the contract, the team was able to get out ahead of what would be substantial dollars in the arbitration process. On Merrill's end, he assures himself of financial security for the next decade. The interest in this particular deal was fairly obvious for each side. Merrill is off to a fantastic start this year, with a 216 wRC+ through the team's first seven games. He hit his first home run on Tuesday night and celebrated his newfound security by launching his second on Wednesday. And he's demonstrating a more refined approach at the plate that could allow his game to reach new heights. The Padres are certainly getting a good deal. Payroll constraints have been present over the last two years, but the presence of Merrill and Tatis should help attract more talent if and when they look to add further. There's still a willingness to invest in the team even with the various background contexts above even the front office's paygrade. That should continue to bode well as the team aims for their first title in franchise history.
  14. Jackson Merrill never wanted to leave San Diego. Now he doesn't have to. Not that Jackson Merrill's future was some looming question for the San Diego Padres, but with arbitration eligibility coming after 2026, the team had incentive to try to lock in some cost certainty with their emerging superstar. They have it now, with Merrill and the Padres agreeing to a nine-year contract extension that includes an option for a 10th season in 2035. Efforts to sign Merrill to a long-term pact were not a secret. The Padres had reportedly approached him before his debut about such a deal, similar to what the Milwaukee Brewers did when they signed Jackson Chourio for eight years ahead of his own rookie campaign in 2024. For his own money, Merrill was satisfied waiting but did note that he wanted to remain in San Diego throughout his career. Now, an organization that lacks a certain degree of longer-term certainty locks in a whole lot more of it. There are long-term contracts on the books throughout the roster. Jake Cronenworth is on the books through 2030. Xander Bogaerts and Manny Machado are each signed through 2033. Fernando Tatis Jr. is signed through 2034. On the bump, they've got 38-year-old Yu Darvish for three more seasons and recovering Joe Musgrove for two. But even with a handful of deals set to carry well into the future, it's not an entirely stable situation. It remains to be seen whether Darvish will see that deal through to the end. Cronenworth has been floated in trade rumors. There are questions about Machado's long-term durability and the impact of his swing on his body. And it remains to be seen whether previous payroll constraints will continue to put the clamps on additional spending in the way that we've seen this organization do in years prior. But between Merrill and Tatis, the Padres have two of their younger talents with more upside than anyone on the roster locked down for the foreseeable future. In Merrill's case, they get that cost certainty more than a year ahead of arbitration. Even with various escalators in the contract, the team was able to get out ahead of what would be substantial dollars in the arbitration process. On Merrill's end, he assures himself of financial security for the next decade. The interest in this particular deal was fairly obvious for each side. Merrill is off to a fantastic start this year, with a 216 wRC+ through the team's first seven games. He hit his first home run on Tuesday night and celebrated his newfound security by launching his second on Wednesday. And he's demonstrating a more refined approach at the plate that could allow his game to reach new heights. The Padres are certainly getting a good deal. Payroll constraints have been present over the last two years, but the presence of Merrill and Tatis should help attract more talent if and when they look to add further. There's still a willingness to invest in the team even with the various background contexts above even the front office's paygrade. That should continue to bode well as the team aims for their first title in franchise history. View full article
  15. At this particular time in other parts of the multiverse, we're likely referring to Jackson Merrill as the "reigning" National League Rookie of the Year. As it were, the Paul Skenes factor left the shortstop-turned-outfielder a mere runner-up. He's anything but for the San Diego Padres, especially if his early plate discipline is to be believed. Examining plate discipline after four games isn't necessarily the best use of one's time. Baseball is a game of sample sizes and analyzing an approach requires far more than the opening series of the year. Which means that if we're talking about Jackson Merrill's plate discipline at this point, it's probably at least noteworthy. Within the context of his exceptional 130 wRC+ rookie campaign, Merrill demonstrated an imperfect approach. His 34.4% chase rate was 16th-highest among qualified batters. That's not good news, but at the same time, it didn't seem to matter a whole lot. While the aggression held his walk rate down to an extremely poor 4.9%, his 79.5% contact rate was well above average, as was his his 64.2% contact rate on pitches outside the zone. You can get away with that type of free-swinging when you're going to make that consistent of contact. That doesn't mean it's an ideal way to go about things, though. Contact outside the zone isn't necessarily a good thing, as players tend to hit the ball weaker when they're swinging at bad pitches. However, Merrill's .373 wOBA and .348 xwOBA on balls in play that came on pitches outside the zone were among the best in baseball. It's probably too early to say, but he might just be a very good bad-ball hitter. Nonetheless, even incremental improvement on the approach side can bump up the run production provided by Merrill's excellent activity on the basepaths. Given that, these first four games have allowed Merrill to demonstrate a bit of maturity as it relates to the approach: Season Pitches Zone% Z-Swing% Z-Contact% O-Swing% O-Contact% Whiff% 2024 2,214 49.3 80 85.8 34.4 64.2 20.5 2025 44 50 72.7 87.5 27.3 100 9.1 Obviously, we're comparing 156 games and 593 plate appearances last year to...four games and 15 in the lower row. But the chase rate being down — and the whiff rate along with it — immediately presents as encouraging. Merrill's chase rate isn't just lower, it's well above the league average. Merrill has also taken more pitches in the zone, but he's still not overly patient, which is an important distinction. You don't want to strip the aggression away entirely when it led to so much success last year. The ideal version of Merrill looks reigned in just a bit. The outcomes speak for themselves. His 6.7% walk rate, while still not great, is higher than last year's. His 6.7% strikeout rate is drastically lower. His line includes a .467 on-base percentage and 185 wRC+ (though his .462 BABIP means we should take these numbers with a grain of salt). And that's with very little power output thus far. A somewhat-but-not-entirely-related component to the swing rates is the swing speed. Merrill's average swing speed is coming in at about the same rate as last year (71.9 mph), but his 27.8% fast swing rate is an improvement of more than six percentage points. As a result, he's experiencing quite a bit more squared-up contact. This all speaks to a guy who is entirely confident in what he's doing right now. Not that he needed the boost coming off a stellar rookie season, but when he's hacking with selective aggression with more consistent bat speed, it appears there's another level to be reached here. Whether it comes to fruition, of course, is going to take us quite a bit longer to discern. Again, four games does not indicate much of anything, and plate discipline statistics are notoriously sticky year-over-year. But considering Merrill's previous level of aggression, improving his selectivity at all could say a lot. There's a long way yet to go, but with a talent like Merrill, these little nuances could make all the difference. View full article
  16. Examining plate discipline after four games isn't necessarily the best use of one's time. Baseball is a game of sample sizes and analyzing an approach requires far more than the opening series of the year. Which means that if we're talking about Jackson Merrill's plate discipline at this point, it's probably at least noteworthy. Within the context of his exceptional 130 wRC+ rookie campaign, Merrill demonstrated an imperfect approach. His 34.4% chase rate was 16th-highest among qualified batters. That's not good news, but at the same time, it didn't seem to matter a whole lot. While the aggression held his walk rate down to an extremely poor 4.9%, his 79.5% contact rate was well above average, as was his his 64.2% contact rate on pitches outside the zone. You can get away with that type of free-swinging when you're going to make that consistent of contact. That doesn't mean it's an ideal way to go about things, though. Contact outside the zone isn't necessarily a good thing, as players tend to hit the ball weaker when they're swinging at bad pitches. However, Merrill's .373 wOBA and .348 xwOBA on balls in play that came on pitches outside the zone were among the best in baseball. It's probably too early to say, but he might just be a very good bad-ball hitter. Nonetheless, even incremental improvement on the approach side can bump up the run production provided by Merrill's excellent activity on the basepaths. Given that, these first four games have allowed Merrill to demonstrate a bit of maturity as it relates to the approach: Season Pitches Zone% Z-Swing% Z-Contact% O-Swing% O-Contact% Whiff% 2024 2,214 49.3 80 85.8 34.4 64.2 20.5 2025 44 50 72.7 87.5 27.3 100 9.1 Obviously, we're comparing 156 games and 593 plate appearances last year to...four games and 15 in the lower row. But the chase rate being down — and the whiff rate along with it — immediately presents as encouraging. Merrill's chase rate isn't just lower, it's well above the league average. Merrill has also taken more pitches in the zone, but he's still not overly patient, which is an important distinction. You don't want to strip the aggression away entirely when it led to so much success last year. The ideal version of Merrill looks reigned in just a bit. The outcomes speak for themselves. His 6.7% walk rate, while still not great, is higher than last year's. His 6.7% strikeout rate is drastically lower. His line includes a .467 on-base percentage and 185 wRC+ (though his .462 BABIP means we should take these numbers with a grain of salt). And that's with very little power output thus far. A somewhat-but-not-entirely-related component to the swing rates is the swing speed. Merrill's average swing speed is coming in at about the same rate as last year (71.9 mph), but his 27.8% fast swing rate is an improvement of more than six percentage points. As a result, he's experiencing quite a bit more squared-up contact. This all speaks to a guy who is entirely confident in what he's doing right now. Not that he needed the boost coming off a stellar rookie season, but when he's hacking with selective aggression with more consistent bat speed, it appears there's another level to be reached here. Whether it comes to fruition, of course, is going to take us quite a bit longer to discern. Again, four games does not indicate much of anything, and plate discipline statistics are notoriously sticky year-over-year. But considering Merrill's previous level of aggression, improving his selectivity at all could say a lot. There's a long way yet to go, but with a talent like Merrill, these little nuances could make all the difference.
  17. Despite rumblings that the team could try to move pending free agent Luis Arráez during the past offseason, the three-time batting champion is still on the roster. His expected role in the lineup, however, has already started to shift. During each of the Padres' first two games, Mike Shildt elected to go with Fernando Tatis Jr. out of the leadoff spot rather than Arráez. The results have been stellar. Tatis has four hits in his first eight plate appearances, with the pair of steals on Thursday and a leadoff home run on Friday that came on the first pitch of the bottom of the first inning. He's scored three of the four times he's reached base, with the Padres grabbing the first two of four against Atlanta. On the other side of the coin, Arráez doesn't have a hit yet in his own eight PAs. But he does have a walk and a sacrifice fly. While two games isn't going to tell us a whole lot about defined roles, it does at least give us some insight into what Shildt may be trying to accomplish out of that top spot in the order. Arráez is obviously an exceptional hitter. He's hit .316, .354, and .314 in each of the last three seasons, respectively. But he's also become more of a one-note presence atop the order in that same set of years. He's never hit for any notable power, but his walk rate has declined, to the point where he maintained a BB% of just 3.6 last year. That's not as much of a concern when you're hitting that much, but his nine steals were also more than twice his previous career high. You're looking at a high volume of balls in play, but not as much in other areas with Arráez as your leadoff hitter. Which is probably part of what Mike Shildt's thinking is regarding Fernando Tatis Jr in such a role. For his career (749 PA), Tatis has a wRC+ of 159 with a .311/.376/.603/.973 slash in that top spot. He also has a .292 ISO and 8.8 BB%. Given the impact, it makes sense that he'd spend most of his time as the no. 2 hitter in the order. At the same time, the emergence of Jackson Merrill and health of a few key contributors down the lineup makes a swap here a bit more logical. With Tatis, you're obviously getting the possibility of electricity right out of the gate, as we saw on Friday night. But the leadoff profile has shifted from a balls-in-play-plus-baserunning guy to someone with a little extra something. Tatis happens to have a little bit of extra everything. Now that he's fully healthy, though, we're also likely to start seeing the baserunning side of it more frequently. He stole 25 bags in 2022 and 29 in 2023. Last year, he was down to 11 given the stress reaction in his femur. So you've got the extra pop and a potential demon on the base paths out of your top spot. That allows Arráez to slide down a spot with his contact skills. If Tatis is running in front of him, that puts the Padres in a position to add some runs early. From there, you get into Manny Machado, Jackson Merrill, and an assortment of quality bats beyond those two. It's an entirely logical construction atop the lineup, especially given how frequently the Padres had to come from behind in 2024. They came back 38 times last year, including five times in the ninth inning. Getting Tatis atop your lineup has the potential to change the dynamic of some of these games. Playing with a lead can take the pressure off of a lineup and a pitching staff, while saving some juice for the end of the season. If the Padres are hoping to stave off the type of disappointment they experienced last October, that juice will come in handy.
  18. On Thursday, Fernando Tatis Jr. became the first member of the San Diego Padres with 2+ hits and 2+ steals on Opening Day. If his new role starts to become permanent, that may be the type of thing we can expect to see a little more of moving forward. Despite rumblings that the team could try to move pending free agent Luis Arráez during the past offseason, the three-time batting champion is still on the roster. His expected role in the lineup, however, has already started to shift. During each of the Padres' first two games, Mike Shildt elected to go with Fernando Tatis Jr. out of the leadoff spot rather than Arráez. The results have been stellar. Tatis has four hits in his first eight plate appearances, with the pair of steals on Thursday and a leadoff home run on Friday that came on the first pitch of the bottom of the first inning. He's scored three of the four times he's reached base, with the Padres grabbing the first two of four against Atlanta. On the other side of the coin, Arráez doesn't have a hit yet in his own eight PAs. But he does have a walk and a sacrifice fly. While two games isn't going to tell us a whole lot about defined roles, it does at least give us some insight into what Shildt may be trying to accomplish out of that top spot in the order. Arráez is obviously an exceptional hitter. He's hit .316, .354, and .314 in each of the last three seasons, respectively. But he's also become more of a one-note presence atop the order in that same set of years. He's never hit for any notable power, but his walk rate has declined, to the point where he maintained a BB% of just 3.6 last year. That's not as much of a concern when you're hitting that much, but his nine steals were also more than twice his previous career high. You're looking at a high volume of balls in play, but not as much in other areas with Arráez as your leadoff hitter. Which is probably part of what Mike Shildt's thinking is regarding Fernando Tatis Jr in such a role. For his career (749 PA), Tatis has a wRC+ of 159 with a .311/.376/.603/.973 slash in that top spot. He also has a .292 ISO and 8.8 BB%. Given the impact, it makes sense that he'd spend most of his time as the no. 2 hitter in the order. At the same time, the emergence of Jackson Merrill and health of a few key contributors down the lineup makes a swap here a bit more logical. With Tatis, you're obviously getting the possibility of electricity right out of the gate, as we saw on Friday night. But the leadoff profile has shifted from a balls-in-play-plus-baserunning guy to someone with a little extra something. Tatis happens to have a little bit of extra everything. Now that he's fully healthy, though, we're also likely to start seeing the baserunning side of it more frequently. He stole 25 bags in 2022 and 29 in 2023. Last year, he was down to 11 given the stress reaction in his femur. So you've got the extra pop and a potential demon on the base paths out of your top spot. That allows Arráez to slide down a spot with his contact skills. If Tatis is running in front of him, that puts the Padres in a position to add some runs early. From there, you get into Manny Machado, Jackson Merrill, and an assortment of quality bats beyond those two. It's an entirely logical construction atop the lineup, especially given how frequently the Padres had to come from behind in 2024. They came back 38 times last year, including five times in the ninth inning. Getting Tatis atop your lineup has the potential to change the dynamic of some of these games. Playing with a lead can take the pressure off of a lineup and a pitching staff, while saving some juice for the end of the season. If the Padres are hoping to stave off the type of disappointment they experienced last October, that juice will come in handy. View full article
  19. Given all that's transpired since it feels like a decade ago, but the San Diego Padres were must-watch television for even the most neutral observers in the not-too-distant past. A new aesthetic combined with an infusion of exciting talent and front-office aggression made them one of the more fascinating organizations in the sport. Fernando Tatis Jr. was, of course, central to this. Tatis broke onto the scene with 84 games in 2019, turned in a very good 59 games during the 2020 season, and was an MVP finalist in 2021. Across two partial and one full season, he never posted a wRC+ figure under 150. The latter campaign saw him turn in a slash that included a .282 average, .364 on-base percentage, and .975 OPS on his way to a 158 wRC+ while ISO'ing an obscene .328. At this point, we know what the subsequent season included. A motorcycle accident-induced broken wrist and a PED suspension wiped out 2022 and forced him into a late start in 2023. After such a lengthy stint away from the game, the readjustment led to underwhelming outcomes that year, not just for Tatis but also for the Padres, who disappointed as a collective. Ahead of 2024, it was natural to wonder whether we'd already seen the best Fernando Tatis Jr.had to offer. That notion proved to be misguided on two separate levels. One is the fact that there is, indeed, quite a good baseball player still in there. The other is that there's probably an even better version of Tatis waiting to be unlocked. The 2024 season saw Tatis turn in a .276/.394/.407/.801 line, finishing with a 135 wRC+ and 3.2 fWAR. In broad strokes, it was well off his 2021 output but improved in a couple of key areas while leaving optimism for others. The most notable absence from Tatis' very solid 2024 campaign was in the power. His ISO checked in at .216, representing his lowest power output besides the tough hang of a 2023 season. The home run total sat at just 21, lower than even 2023 when he ISO'd only .191 but hit 25. His walk rate was also at its lowest, with a mere 7.3 BB%. But there were also worthy improvements elsewhere. The K%, at 21.9, was the lowest of his career. His 74.4 percent contact rate was his highest, while his 12.8 Whiff% was his best over a full season. His bat speed was also up a tick, his rate of fast swings skyrocketed, and he experienced a 4-5 percent increase in rates of squared-up contact and blasts. The former developments speak to a maturation in his approach, the latter to the idea that 2023 served as a readjustment for Tatis above all. Regardless, all of it should have led to better outcomes given this: While the approach was improved for Tatis within his own individual context, it's obviously not quite there with the rest of the league. But the actual contact trends indicate that this guy has far more electricity in the stick than we saw come to fruition last season. Most of those percentile rankings look similar to where they fell in 2021, with the approach figures also sitting much higher than they did even then. We can objectively say that Fernando Tatis Jr.was good in 2024. The above indicates he was quite a bit more than that. The projections ahead of the 2025 season are indicative of just that. Each of Steamer & ZiPS has him checking in at a wRC+ above 140, with a return to ISO figures well above .200. Steamer likes him for a .253 figure, and ZiPS is at .249. PECOTA has him jumping back up over 30 homers and a 126 DRC+ (and even that's with the BABIP coming down back under .300). Anywhere you turn, the machines are in love with Fernando Tatis Jr.and his 2025 prospects. The combination of increased health and maturity (both on and off the field) gives us no reason to doubt them. He had the 2023 readjustment, and the physical tools manifested again in 2024. It's all there. It's probably time for us to get back on board.
  20. Fernando Tatis Jr.'s career has stabilized after a rapid ascent and even faster fall. Does this mean we should expect a return to his meteoric upside in 2025? Given all that's transpired since it feels like a decade ago, but the San Diego Padres were must-watch television for even the most neutral observers in the not-too-distant past. A new aesthetic combined with an infusion of exciting talent and front-office aggression made them one of the more fascinating organizations in the sport. Fernando Tatis Jr. was, of course, central to this. Tatis broke onto the scene with 84 games in 2019, turned in a very good 59 games during the 2020 season, and was an MVP finalist in 2021. Across two partial and one full season, he never posted a wRC+ figure under 150. The latter campaign saw him turn in a slash that included a .282 average, .364 on-base percentage, and .975 OPS on his way to a 158 wRC+ while ISO'ing an obscene .328. At this point, we know what the subsequent season included. A motorcycle accident-induced broken wrist and a PED suspension wiped out 2022 and forced him into a late start in 2023. After such a lengthy stint away from the game, the readjustment led to underwhelming outcomes that year, not just for Tatis but also for the Padres, who disappointed as a collective. Ahead of 2024, it was natural to wonder whether we'd already seen the best Fernando Tatis Jr.had to offer. That notion proved to be misguided on two separate levels. One is the fact that there is, indeed, quite a good baseball player still in there. The other is that there's probably an even better version of Tatis waiting to be unlocked. The 2024 season saw Tatis turn in a .276/.394/.407/.801 line, finishing with a 135 wRC+ and 3.2 fWAR. In broad strokes, it was well off his 2021 output but improved in a couple of key areas while leaving optimism for others. The most notable absence from Tatis' very solid 2024 campaign was in the power. His ISO checked in at .216, representing his lowest power output besides the tough hang of a 2023 season. The home run total sat at just 21, lower than even 2023 when he ISO'd only .191 but hit 25. His walk rate was also at its lowest, with a mere 7.3 BB%. But there were also worthy improvements elsewhere. The K%, at 21.9, was the lowest of his career. His 74.4 percent contact rate was his highest, while his 12.8 Whiff% was his best over a full season. His bat speed was also up a tick, his rate of fast swings skyrocketed, and he experienced a 4-5 percent increase in rates of squared-up contact and blasts. The former developments speak to a maturation in his approach, the latter to the idea that 2023 served as a readjustment for Tatis above all. Regardless, all of it should have led to better outcomes given this: While the approach was improved for Tatis within his own individual context, it's obviously not quite there with the rest of the league. But the actual contact trends indicate that this guy has far more electricity in the stick than we saw come to fruition last season. Most of those percentile rankings look similar to where they fell in 2021, with the approach figures also sitting much higher than they did even then. We can objectively say that Fernando Tatis Jr.was good in 2024. The above indicates he was quite a bit more than that. The projections ahead of the 2025 season are indicative of just that. Each of Steamer & ZiPS has him checking in at a wRC+ above 140, with a return to ISO figures well above .200. Steamer likes him for a .253 figure, and ZiPS is at .249. PECOTA has him jumping back up over 30 homers and a 126 DRC+ (and even that's with the BABIP coming down back under .300). Anywhere you turn, the machines are in love with Fernando Tatis Jr.and his 2025 prospects. The combination of increased health and maturity (both on and off the field) gives us no reason to doubt them. He had the 2023 readjustment, and the physical tools manifested again in 2024. It's all there. It's probably time for us to get back on board. View full article
  21. On the surface, the San Diego Padres were not a good defensive baseball team last season. They sat in the league's bottom third in Fielding Run Value (FRV), courtesy of a -12 mark under Statcast's comprehensive fielding metric. By that metric alone, they were the worst in the National League West. Only Miami, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and Washington sat behind them on the senior circuit. That shouldn't serve as any sort of indicator for 2025, however. Defense is important. Of the dozen teams that lived to play October baseball in 2024, seven — the Yankees (36), Royals (35), Guardians (31), Brewers (29), Tigers (26), Phillies (10), and Mets (9) — ranked inside of the top 11 in Fielding Run Value. The first five teams on that list occupied spots two through seven on the FRV leaderboard. Atlanta trailed closely behind that group at 13 (3). Only the Astros (-2), Dodgers (-12), and Orioles (-15) found themselves in league with the Padres' 21st-ranked group (-12). There's a clear threshold that separates the elite defensive teams, the average (or around there) defensive teams, and the bad defensive teams. Last year, a threshold separated the Mets and the 12th-ranked Rays (3 FRV), and another separated the Astros and the Dodgers, who ranked 19th and 20th in FRV, respectively. The FRV leaderboard shows that quality defense gives you a chance of being in the postseason mix. While there are notable exceptions (first-ranked Toronto finished last in the American League East), the high volume of postseason teams near the top of that board tells you what you need to know. On top of that, we saw the disastrous effects that come when those teams falter on that side of the ball in October. Sure, it's possible to hit your way into the playoffs. But once you're there, you win on the strength of your defense. The regular season is about run production. The postseason is about run prevention. Which presents both good and bad news for the 2025 iteration of the Padres of San Diego. Below is how FanGraphs projects the Friars to line up in 2025: Let's talk about the positives first. Jackson Merrill was the team's top defender last year, checking in at a FRV of 10. He was a true darling of Statcast, sitting favorably in just about any metric we can throw at him (Jump, Catch Probability, etc.). Center field is in steady hands with Merrill moving forward. It's a similar case with Fernando Tatis Jr. While his overall defensive output isn't as loud, he was above average by FRV (2) and has proven almost too athletic for right field, allowing him to compensate for any shortcomings in jump or specific outfield components. Left field isn't as settled as the other two spots, at least in terms of personnel. While Jason Heyward projects to get the majority of the time there, Brandon Lockridge and, eventually, Connor Joe should factor into the platoon against left-handed pitching. Heyward and Lockridge represent the higher-upside duo from a defensive standpoint. Heyward's left field experience is limited, but he's been an all-world defender for much of his career. Lockridge provides an effective supplement with range and athleticism of his own. Considering Jurickson Profar turned in a -6 FRV at the spot in 2024, you're looking at a significant upgrade on that third of the grass as it relates to defense. Changes should help the Padres behind the plate, as well, even if only modestly. After spending the majority of last year with Kyle Higashioka (good defender) and Luis Campusano (bad defender; literal worst on the team defender) serving as one half of the battery, San Diego will start '25 off with a combination of Elías Díaz and Martín Maldonado managing the pitching staff. Díaz sat 17th out of 100 backstops in Baseball Prospectus' Deserved Runs Prevented metric (2.8). Given that Higashioka was directly in front of him, the defensive impact of a catcher change should remain fairly minimal. At this late stage of his career, Maldonado isn't the defender his reputation would have you believe, but he was much better in 2024 than in 2023 (though in a smaller sample), and was certainly better than Campusano, who sat 98th out of that group in DRP. Ultimately, it's largely a wash in the turnover there, but even a slight improvement with the optioning of Campusano still represents improvement nonetheless. The largest questions for the Padres' gloves come on the infield. Xander Bogaerts (4) and Jake Cronenworth (3) were the team's second and third-best defenders by FRV in 2024. However, that output came at positions at which they will no longer spend the majority of their time. In roughly 150 innings at short, Bogaerts checked in at a -1 FRV, while Cronenworth was -3 at the keystone across almost 600. In Cronenworth's case at least, there's a history of quality defense at his regular position. The 2024 campaign was actually the first in which the veteran posted a below average FRV at the spot. Unless you're a true utility player, there's something to be said for positional stability against your actual defensive output. The hope is that he can reestablish his defensive value with more consistency in starting at second. Bogaerts' reintegration at shortstop is perhaps the largest defensive question facing this team. There's a reason the organization swapped him with Ha-Seong Kim last season. But it should be noted that such a change likely boiled down to arm strength more than any other deep-rooted issue within Bogaerts' game. His two most recent seasons as a full-time shortstop (2022 and 2023) were his only above-average FRV years at the position. And he has 88th percentile range. Of course, 15th percentile arm strength remains less than ideal. The team is undoubtedly going to miss Kim's blend of range and arm strength. But Bogaerts had demonstrated marked growth in the face of a narrative that was at least somewhat misguided. He could be fine there. That doesn't change the fact that it's the unit's most notable question, though. Unless, of course, you count Manny Machado. He was precisely average with the glove by FRV (0). That represents a pretty steep decline from a 9 FRV 2023. His range also fell from the 97th percentile in '23 to 38th in 2024. One has to wonder how much of this was due to a late start after offseason surgery and the subsequent workload management. If those numbers stay low, then perhaps we can have that conversation. But until then, we have no reason to think that Manny Machado is anyone other than the defender he's always been. Given where the Padres finished on the FRV leaderboard in 2024, it's not difficult to find where the improvement will come. Luis Campusano's present subtraction via option brings the figure up some behind the plate. Profar's absence via free agency helps in left (even if it hurts on the other side of things). Moving guys back into more stable positions could be a boon, too. There are a lot of things we could identify as...less than stable within this organization. The testy ownership situation, for one. Pitching, for another. But this year's roster construction should help to at least remove defense from that portion of the discussion. It stands to be better. Potentially even much better. With a top-heavy offensive group and a rotation that lacks depth, it's a fascinating test of defense's value. If the Padres lose some steam off top 12-ish performances in those two respects, could a rise in the third phase help to compensate? We're about to find out.
  22. You don't have to be a good defensive team to win a World Series. But it helps. On the surface, the San Diego Padres were not a good defensive baseball team last season. They sat in the league's bottom third in Fielding Run Value (FRV), courtesy of a -12 mark under Statcast's comprehensive fielding metric. By that metric alone, they were the worst in the National League West. Only Miami, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and Washington sat behind them on the senior circuit. That shouldn't serve as any sort of indicator for 2025, however. Defense is important. Of the dozen teams that lived to play October baseball in 2024, seven — the Yankees (36), Royals (35), Guardians (31), Brewers (29), Tigers (26), Phillies (10), and Mets (9) — ranked inside of the top 11 in Fielding Run Value. The first five teams on that list occupied spots two through seven on the FRV leaderboard. Atlanta trailed closely behind that group at 13 (3). Only the Astros (-2), Dodgers (-12), and Orioles (-15) found themselves in league with the Padres' 21st-ranked group (-12). There's a clear threshold that separates the elite defensive teams, the average (or around there) defensive teams, and the bad defensive teams. Last year, a threshold separated the Mets and the 12th-ranked Rays (3 FRV), and another separated the Astros and the Dodgers, who ranked 19th and 20th in FRV, respectively. The FRV leaderboard shows that quality defense gives you a chance of being in the postseason mix. While there are notable exceptions (first-ranked Toronto finished last in the American League East), the high volume of postseason teams near the top of that board tells you what you need to know. On top of that, we saw the disastrous effects that come when those teams falter on that side of the ball in October. Sure, it's possible to hit your way into the playoffs. But once you're there, you win on the strength of your defense. The regular season is about run production. The postseason is about run prevention. Which presents both good and bad news for the 2025 iteration of the Padres of San Diego. Below is how FanGraphs projects the Friars to line up in 2025: Let's talk about the positives first. Jackson Merrill was the team's top defender last year, checking in at a FRV of 10. He was a true darling of Statcast, sitting favorably in just about any metric we can throw at him (Jump, Catch Probability, etc.). Center field is in steady hands with Merrill moving forward. It's a similar case with Fernando Tatis Jr. While his overall defensive output isn't as loud, he was above average by FRV (2) and has proven almost too athletic for right field, allowing him to compensate for any shortcomings in jump or specific outfield components. Left field isn't as settled as the other two spots, at least in terms of personnel. While Jason Heyward projects to get the majority of the time there, Brandon Lockridge and, eventually, Connor Joe should factor into the platoon against left-handed pitching. Heyward and Lockridge represent the higher-upside duo from a defensive standpoint. Heyward's left field experience is limited, but he's been an all-world defender for much of his career. Lockridge provides an effective supplement with range and athleticism of his own. Considering Jurickson Profar turned in a -6 FRV at the spot in 2024, you're looking at a significant upgrade on that third of the grass as it relates to defense. Changes should help the Padres behind the plate, as well, even if only modestly. After spending the majority of last year with Kyle Higashioka (good defender) and Luis Campusano (bad defender; literal worst on the team defender) serving as one half of the battery, San Diego will start '25 off with a combination of Elías Díaz and Martín Maldonado managing the pitching staff. Díaz sat 17th out of 100 backstops in Baseball Prospectus' Deserved Runs Prevented metric (2.8). Given that Higashioka was directly in front of him, the defensive impact of a catcher change should remain fairly minimal. At this late stage of his career, Maldonado isn't the defender his reputation would have you believe, but he was much better in 2024 than in 2023 (though in a smaller sample), and was certainly better than Campusano, who sat 98th out of that group in DRP. Ultimately, it's largely a wash in the turnover there, but even a slight improvement with the optioning of Campusano still represents improvement nonetheless. The largest questions for the Padres' gloves come on the infield. Xander Bogaerts (4) and Jake Cronenworth (3) were the team's second and third-best defenders by FRV in 2024. However, that output came at positions at which they will no longer spend the majority of their time. In roughly 150 innings at short, Bogaerts checked in at a -1 FRV, while Cronenworth was -3 at the keystone across almost 600. In Cronenworth's case at least, there's a history of quality defense at his regular position. The 2024 campaign was actually the first in which the veteran posted a below average FRV at the spot. Unless you're a true utility player, there's something to be said for positional stability against your actual defensive output. The hope is that he can reestablish his defensive value with more consistency in starting at second. Bogaerts' reintegration at shortstop is perhaps the largest defensive question facing this team. There's a reason the organization swapped him with Ha-Seong Kim last season. But it should be noted that such a change likely boiled down to arm strength more than any other deep-rooted issue within Bogaerts' game. His two most recent seasons as a full-time shortstop (2022 and 2023) were his only above-average FRV years at the position. And he has 88th percentile range. Of course, 15th percentile arm strength remains less than ideal. The team is undoubtedly going to miss Kim's blend of range and arm strength. But Bogaerts had demonstrated marked growth in the face of a narrative that was at least somewhat misguided. He could be fine there. That doesn't change the fact that it's the unit's most notable question, though. Unless, of course, you count Manny Machado. He was precisely average with the glove by FRV (0). That represents a pretty steep decline from a 9 FRV 2023. His range also fell from the 97th percentile in '23 to 38th in 2024. One has to wonder how much of this was due to a late start after offseason surgery and the subsequent workload management. If those numbers stay low, then perhaps we can have that conversation. But until then, we have no reason to think that Manny Machado is anyone other than the defender he's always been. Given where the Padres finished on the FRV leaderboard in 2024, it's not difficult to find where the improvement will come. Luis Campusano's present subtraction via option brings the figure up some behind the plate. Profar's absence via free agency helps in left (even if it hurts on the other side of things). Moving guys back into more stable positions could be a boon, too. There are a lot of things we could identify as...less than stable within this organization. The testy ownership situation, for one. Pitching, for another. But this year's roster construction should help to at least remove defense from that portion of the discussion. It stands to be better. Potentially even much better. With a top-heavy offensive group and a rotation that lacks depth, it's a fascinating test of defense's value. If the Padres lose some steam off top 12-ish performances in those two respects, could a rise in the third phase help to compensate? We're about to find out. View full article
  23. Despite standing on the precipice of a World Series berth just six months ago, questions permeate the air in America's Finest City™. Chief among them: the future of the Padres' second-baseman-turned-first-baseman-turned-second-baseman. When the Padres rewarded Jake Cronenworth with a seven-year extension ahead of the 2023 season, it was clear they saw him as a permanent piece of their lineup. Given the contract's fairly modest nature (a shade over $11 million per year), it seemed logical. After a breakout during the sprint of 2020, Cronenworth posted 3.7 fWAR in each of the two subsequent seasons, combining for 38 home runs and a 113 wRC+. A versatile infielder with above-average production that can hit all over the lineup? You pay that price for that type of player without hesitation. Of course, you also expect that production level to maintain into even year one of said deal. The latest pair of seasons has featured a clunky transition to first base and a notable decline in offensive production. Cronenworth was a below-average performer by wRC+ (91) in 2023 and just scratched back to above in 2024 (104). While it hasn't been to the extent of some of his counterparts throughout the roster, Cronenworth's name also hasn't been immune to floating around in the trade rumor ether. Could 2025 provide a reset regarding his value and our overall expectations? Cronenworth's move to first was necessitated by the long-term deal awarded to Xander Bogaerts. At that moment, Ha-Seong Kim was forced to second and Cronenworth to first. An early injury to Bogaerts last year was a factor in the team's acquisition of Luis Arráez. And while Arráez wound up splitting time between first base and designated hitter, Cronenworth still spent almost 150 more innings at first than second. With Kim now in Tampa Bay, the configuration resets to allow Cronenworth to return to the keystone full-time, with brief cameos still likely set to unfold at first. Not entirely unlike Arráez, who exists as his separate conversation in all of this, one of the issues with Cronenworth logging such heavy time at first base is in the profile. In 2025, the average ISO figure for a qualifying first baseman was .174. The average on-base percentage was .321, and the average home run total was 21. Comprehensively, the position averaged a wRC+ of 114 when it was all said and done. In contrast, second base went .135, .325, 15, and 104, respectively, in that hodgepodge of offensive figures. Given Cronenworth's output, which included a .149 ISO, .324 OBP, 17 homers, and a 105 wRC+, which position fits his skill set more appropriately is fairly straightforward. The profile is important because it allows you to manage expectations properly. Cronenworth was never an ideal offensive first baseman. His career ISO checks in at .163, and his home run power peaked in 2021 when he hit 21. He was also a 40th percentile guy in average exit velocity, a 29th percentile guy in Hard Hit %, and a 50th percentile guy in Barrel %. While he's consistently demonstrated a keen approach and an ability to avoid the K, the power just isn't there to support the idea of him as a regular first-sacker. And this is all working in Jake Cronenworth's favor for 2025. The power output has stabilized around the .150 mark in ISO, and his OBP regularly sits above .320. If you're getting that out of him again in the upcoming season, you're getting average second-base production at worst. Steamer has him at .242/.322/.393/.714, with a .151 ISO and 105 wRC+. ZiPS is at .240/.322/.391/.713, .152, and 104. The rest of the projections down the list convey a similar idea. It is also worth considering whether he can beat those projections and exceed expectations that have been redefined after two underwhelming seasons. Not much has changed in the approach. There's been an uptick in swing rate since his first two years, but that also came largely in the zone. The result was fewer called strikes, but there isn't a recognizable detriment in that slight increase in aggression. Nor can we glean too much out of his pitch selection. Offspeed has sat atop his swing rates each year in the bigs. Fastballs and breaking pitches have alternated throughout. But nothing discernible there, either. The swing has looked the same, too. So, it doesn't appear to be anything mechanical. Perhaps Statcast's new batter positioning data could give us some insight. Unless it's there, the only explanation is that Cronenworth has always been what he is now rather than hoping for some sort of return to a form that doesn't exist. That would leave the first two seasons as something of an aberration rather than an actual decline. But, again, even if there isn't more in the bat than we've seen, the current iteration of Jake Cronenworth is perfectly acceptable for his new (old) role. A return to the keystone should allow him to return to above-average defense, with his occasional versatility being a boon for the roster construction as a whole. The Cronenworth narrative exists in its current form largely as a byproduct of the move to first base. Don't underestimate the psychological impact of returning to a position of comfort. View full article
  24. When the Padres rewarded Jake Cronenworth with a seven-year extension ahead of the 2023 season, it was clear they saw him as a permanent piece of their lineup. Given the contract's fairly modest nature (a shade over $11 million per year), it seemed logical. After a breakout during the sprint of 2020, Cronenworth posted 3.7 fWAR in each of the two subsequent seasons, combining for 38 home runs and a 113 wRC+. A versatile infielder with above-average production that can hit all over the lineup? You pay that price for that type of player without hesitation. Of course, you also expect that production level to maintain into even year one of said deal. The latest pair of seasons has featured a clunky transition to first base and a notable decline in offensive production. Cronenworth was a below-average performer by wRC+ (91) in 2023 and just scratched back to above in 2024 (104). While it hasn't been to the extent of some of his counterparts throughout the roster, Cronenworth's name also hasn't been immune to floating around in the trade rumor ether. Could 2025 provide a reset regarding his value and our overall expectations? Cronenworth's move to first was necessitated by the long-term deal awarded to Xander Bogaerts. At that moment, Ha-Seong Kim was forced to second and Cronenworth to first. An early injury to Bogaerts last year was a factor in the team's acquisition of Luis Arráez. And while Arráez wound up splitting time between first base and designated hitter, Cronenworth still spent almost 150 more innings at first than second. With Kim now in Tampa Bay, the configuration resets to allow Cronenworth to return to the keystone full-time, with brief cameos still likely set to unfold at first. Not entirely unlike Arráez, who exists as his separate conversation in all of this, one of the issues with Cronenworth logging such heavy time at first base is in the profile. In 2025, the average ISO figure for a qualifying first baseman was .174. The average on-base percentage was .321, and the average home run total was 21. Comprehensively, the position averaged a wRC+ of 114 when it was all said and done. In contrast, second base went .135, .325, 15, and 104, respectively, in that hodgepodge of offensive figures. Given Cronenworth's output, which included a .149 ISO, .324 OBP, 17 homers, and a 105 wRC+, which position fits his skill set more appropriately is fairly straightforward. The profile is important because it allows you to manage expectations properly. Cronenworth was never an ideal offensive first baseman. His career ISO checks in at .163, and his home run power peaked in 2021 when he hit 21. He was also a 40th percentile guy in average exit velocity, a 29th percentile guy in Hard Hit %, and a 50th percentile guy in Barrel %. While he's consistently demonstrated a keen approach and an ability to avoid the K, the power just isn't there to support the idea of him as a regular first-sacker. And this is all working in Jake Cronenworth's favor for 2025. The power output has stabilized around the .150 mark in ISO, and his OBP regularly sits above .320. If you're getting that out of him again in the upcoming season, you're getting average second-base production at worst. Steamer has him at .242/.322/.393/.714, with a .151 ISO and 105 wRC+. ZiPS is at .240/.322/.391/.713, .152, and 104. The rest of the projections down the list convey a similar idea. It is also worth considering whether he can beat those projections and exceed expectations that have been redefined after two underwhelming seasons. Not much has changed in the approach. There's been an uptick in swing rate since his first two years, but that also came largely in the zone. The result was fewer called strikes, but there isn't a recognizable detriment in that slight increase in aggression. Nor can we glean too much out of his pitch selection. Offspeed has sat atop his swing rates each year in the bigs. Fastballs and breaking pitches have alternated throughout. But nothing discernible there, either. The swing has looked the same, too. So, it doesn't appear to be anything mechanical. Perhaps Statcast's new batter positioning data could give us some insight. Unless it's there, the only explanation is that Cronenworth has always been what he is now rather than hoping for some sort of return to a form that doesn't exist. That would leave the first two seasons as something of an aberration rather than an actual decline. But, again, even if there isn't more in the bat than we've seen, the current iteration of Jake Cronenworth is perfectly acceptable for his new (old) role. A return to the keystone should allow him to return to above-average defense, with his occasional versatility being a boon for the roster construction as a whole. The Cronenworth narrative exists in its current form largely as a byproduct of the move to first base. Don't underestimate the psychological impact of returning to a position of comfort.
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