Randy Holt

Regardless of label or title for the executive in charge, running a Major League Baseball organization in the year 2025 is largely about risk aversion. The culture of the league lends itself to front offices attempting to do one of two things: they're either attempting to strike a balance between contention in the present and longer-term organizational health in the form of the farm system, or they're gutting their roster for the rebuild so that they can get to the point of the other option. There isn't a whole lot of existence elsewhere on the spectrum. Unless you're A.J. Preller. Preller isn't the most active executive the sport has to offer — such a superlative might be reserved for someone excelling in the pure volume game like Seattle's Jerry DiPoto — but he might just be the most significant. In acquiring players such as Mason Miller, Ryan O'Hearn, and Ramón Laureano at this year's trade deadline, Preller essentially dispatched with most of the higher-upside prospects his organization had to offer. For a president of baseball operations who carries the reputation that he does, it wasn't terribly surprising. But it still spoke to Preller's refusal to adhere to the typical standard operating procedure among his front office counterparts. Whether Preller's method of operating — wherein he trades prospects by the bunch in order to add to the active roster over a given season — is a successful model to follow doesn't require too much deliberation. The fact that it has yet to manifest in a championship for the Padres makes it an easy call. So does the team's inability/unwillingness to re-sign Juan Soto long-term after moving so much starting-caliber talent in the first place. The data beyond the anecdotal doesn't fall too much in his favor, either: The additional context in Frey's post (that the WAR figures are all pre-deadline) likely means that things are a little bit worse in reality. Then, there's this: There are a couple of components of the above insights worth examining while at the same time offering at least something of a defense for Preller. First is the fact that, yes, Preller has traded away an obscene amount of current major league talent. Some names that were once in the Padres organization include Trea Turner, Max Fried, James Wood, MacKenzie Gore, and Emmanuel Clase, among others. Even looking at last year's MLB Pipeline Top 30 Padres prospects, only 13 names still remain with the organization. From either group, some of those traded, like Wood & Gore, were moved in blockbusters. Others, like Clase, were in much smaller deals. But you could also do that same exercise for every organization in Major League Baseball. It's the nature of such deep systems and such a high volume of players that you're going to move guys that will go on to great success with other organizations. Preller's manner of doing business means he's more liable to it. Still, the fact that it's happened with some of the names listed above doesn't necessarily illustrate a flaw specific to Preller. As far as the second piece of information goes, such a minimal contribution from system players doesn't mean that the Padres are incapable of developing talent. Just that they sort of refuse to. Many of them were at the lower levels of the minors when they were moved, indicative of a desire for present winning rather than a focus on future projection. As Preller has gotten more into this current iteration of the Padres, he's been more susceptible to moving minor league talent. It's a logical progression of his process that, again, isn't telling us anything unexpected. Ultimately, though, both parts help to really tell the story of A.J. Preller. There's a desperation. Whether it's a noble desperation to bring a championship to San Diego or borne more out of self-preservation at this stage of his career, it's a desperation all the same. But while the strategy from the standpoint of the entire timeline is mostly indefensible, the present era in the Padres organization actually does make Preller's movement this year, in moving Leo De Vries, entirely logical. Preller has the Padres serving as a perennial playoff contender. It's varying degrees of Actual National League Pennant Threat depending on the year, but they're in the mix regardless. It's a window. The type of window that exists when you're rostering the likes of Fernando Tatis Jr., Manny Machado, and Jackson Merrill all at the same time and all on long-term contracts. So when Preller makes drastic moves in dealing 14 players from various levels of the system, he's doing so in attempting to capture success in that very window. Mason Miller is under team control through 2029. Freddy Fermin, too. That's a massive upgrade to your staff and some long-needed stability behind the plate for longer than it might take specific prospects even to reach the top level. To say nothing of the fact that Laureano has a club option and acquired starter JP Sears has another three years of team control in his own right. Don't forget that this was a team rapidly headed toward baseball purgatory. Their offense was middling, and some of their key arms are destined for free agency this winter. Much, if not most, of the minor league talent in the system pre-deadline wasn't going to contribute in 2026, let alone 2027 or 2028. Preller was able to proactively fill spots on the roster in a way that should prove to be more impactful and more sustainable, rather than filling the gaps on spring training invites and short-term solutions as he was forced to do this past winter. This isn't meant to be a total defense of A.J. Preller. It does, however, create something of a paradox. His insatiable need to add immediate talent to the active roster is almost entirely due to his own transaction history. That previous aggression is more difficult to defend when you don't win, don't extend the marquee talent, and put yourself in a situation where budgetary constraints (real or imagined) loom each winter. But now? Now you kind of have to. And that requirement has put Preller in a position where he comes out of the deadline looking entirely rational in his approach. He's now set the Padres up to not only threaten the Los Angeles Dodgers down the stretch but have far more stability with respect to the current roster over the next few offseasons than they might otherwise have had. One might not love how he got there in the first place, but it's impossible to argue against the idea that he's pushing to maximize the window, a concept that more than one league executive could stand to take note of. View full article

The catching situation for the San Diego Padres in 2025 was never going to be completely tenable. In fact, it wasn't even remotely tenable. In reality, the Padres had been skating by on a little bit of luck behind the plate over the last few years. They got some really nice production out of Gary Sánchez in 2023 before Kyle Higashioka parlayed his stealing of the starting job last year into a lucrative two-year pact with Texas. Neither was meant to be a long-term solution, however. The team also failed to bring in such an answer ahead of this season. Last winter, San Diego brought back late-season pickup Elías Díaz on January 30th. That came exactly two weeks after they agreed to a minor league deal with veteran backstop Martín Maldonado. It was a low-risk pairing that allowed the team to work within the confines of their budgetary limitations, but there was also never going to be a high-reward aspect. You kind of knew exactly what you were getting. Unfortunately, that minimal upside has come to pass in more ways than one in '25. Díaz has turned in a wRC+ of just 67 across 85 games while providing decent defense. Maldonado, meanwhile, was at a wRC+ of 61 (64 games) and was below average on the defensive side just about everywhere. All told, only the Washington Nationals have gotten less than the -0.9 fWAR that San Diego has seen from behind the plate. As such, it wasn't a matter of if A.J. Preller would seek to upside the catching position ahead of the trade deadline, but how it would be addressed. Options did exist, and none at a prohibitive cost. Korey Lee gave way to a pair of youngsters on the South Side of Chicago. Ryan Jeffers was playing out a season for an increasingly bad team out of Minnesota. Reese McGuire might've been an option out of Chicago had Miguel Amaya returned for the Cubs before the deadline. All of those names were floated as possibilities, whether real or imagined. Instead, Preller went a route that few might've expected in acquiring Freddy Fermin from the Kansas City Royals. Fermin is 30 years old but has only been at the top level as a regular since 2023. He broke onto the scene with Kansas City via a 108 wRC+ and nice defensive metrics two years ago before taking a bit of a step back at the plate in '24 (92 wRC+). He's regressed further in 2025 (78 wRC+) but still provides an upgrade over what the team was getting out of the Díaz-Maldonado duo. Given that Preller also acquired Ramón Laureano and Ryan O'Hearn, though, the more immediate concern is going to be what Fermin can offer from a defensive standpoint. From a framing standpoint, Fermin technically sits above average. He's accrued one Catcher Framing Runs (per Statcast), putting him 23rd among 56 qualifying catchers. That sits fairly well ahead of where Maldonado's -1 (34th) and Díaz's -4 (50th) rank. On the blocking side, Fermin is at three Blocks Above Average. That's 19th among 63 catchers with enough chances to qualify there. That's slightly ahead of Díaz (two) and miles in front of Maldonado (-8). If we expanded the range to include each of the last three seasons, Fermin is a top-10 blocker at the position with 13 Blocks Above Average. That puts him right at No. 10 while Díaz checks in at 35th and Maldonado at 52nd. It's a trend that largely carries over to managing the run game, as well. Fermin is exactly average in Caught Stealing Above Average (zero) which does put him behind Díaz (one) for 2025. It does, however, put him well ahead of Maldonado (-5), who ranked 65th out of 66 catchers. If we did the same expansion of the timeframe, though, Fermin jumps up to the 10th spot, just narrowly ahead of Díaz. It seems worth noting that Fermin also possesses one of the faster pop times (1.89 sec) in all of baseball. So it goes without saying that the team is getting an upgrade behind the dish in Freddy Fermin. It's not a massive defensive upgrade over Díaz in every respect, but it is in most of them. To say nothing of the bump you get at the plate (even if Fermin does remain a below average hitter). In shedding Maldonado, as the Padres did in quickly designating him for assignment, the team stands to get a tangible upgrade. What's more is that this is a medium-term move for the Padres. This isn't yet another situation where the team has a catcher settle in only to depart in the subsequent offseason. Instead, Fermin is under team control through 2029. So, you're getting a wholly solid defensive catcher who's shown a bit more with the bat than he's demonstrated in '25. Moving some depth in Ryan Bergert and Stephen Kolek made it a hefty price to pay, but it's one that offers some stability to a position that has lacked it entirely in San Diego in recent years. On paper, that type of move is worth the cost. View full article

It's in A.J. Preller's nature to be the center of attention. Seemingly every deadline, the San Diego Padres shake the ground with a significant addition and with little regard for the prospect cost that so many other organizations hold dear. This year was, of course, no exception. If anything, it set a new standard for the executive. Preller parted with nearly a third of the team's top 30 prospects (per MLB Pipeline). Gone across the team's major deals from Thursday are Leo De Vries (formerly no. 1), Braden Nett (no. 3), Boston Bateman (no. 4), Cobb Hightower (no. 6), Tyson Neighbors (no. 12), Henry Baez (no. 13), Eduarniel Núñez (no. 17), Brandon Valenzuela (no. 26), and Victor Figueroa (no. 29). This comes in addition to sending pitchers Stephen Kolek & Ryan Bergert and outfielder Brandon Lockridge out of town. While the latter trio represent some needed depth, the headline of the day is that the bottom tier system becomes even more barren, but flags fly forever. At least, that's what Preller is hoping he can say in a few months' time. In their place are some new components essential the roster. Mason Miller was obviously the major get for the Padres. He joins in conjunction with JP Sears out of the Athletics organization, providing additional heat at the end of the bullpen (in Miller's case) and some stability toward the back of the rotation (in the form of Sears). Preller then moved to poach catcher Freddy Fermin from Kansas City for the two major league arms before jumping over to Baltimore for designated hitter Ryan O'Hearn and outfielder Ramón Laureano. For good measure, Preller also acquired Will Wagner from Toronto, providing the team with some optionable versatility in the infield. It's a series of moves that not only rattles the organization's farm system but the current on-field roster. Six new players join the fray, with roles that were rather sturdy in nature set to shift on both sides of the ball. Here's what we're expecting each position to look like moving forward: Catcher Aside from left field, catcher represented the most desperate need for the Padres. Fermin forced his way into something of a timeshare alongside Kansas City legend Salvador Perez over the last two years. He doesn't offer too much on the offensive side, but neither did the previous duo of Elías Díaz and Martín Maldonado. Fermin replaces the latter, who was designated for assignment upon his arrival and grades as an above-average framer and average thrower from behind the plate. He'll likely get the bulk of the starts with Díaz being relegated to a clear backup role. For what it's worth, Baseball Prospectus has Fermin occupying the spot behind the plate 60 percent of the time moving forward. First Base The configuration here is going to be really interesting. Of the team's active roster, Luis Arráez has appeared at first in 85 games. Gavin Sheets follows him with 12 appearances, and Jake Cronenworth has 11. Arráez has also graded very poorly defensively as the team's first sacker. Enter Ryan O'Hearn. He wasn't a full-time first baseman in Baltimore but still grabbed 48 appearances there (tied with Ryan Mountcastle for the team lead). Notably, O'Hearn has actually received quite favorable grades on the defensive side; he's at six Outs Above Average for the year; Arráez is at the literal other end of the spectrum with a -6 OAA. The assumption here is that O'Hearn gets the lion's share of the time while Arráez serves more of a straightforward DH role moving forward. BP leans that way, too, giving O'Hearn 60 percent of the time down the stretch. Second Base, Shortstop, Third Base Nothing to see here. Cronenworth did not, in fact, end up traded, while the left side of the infield was never expected to be anything other than Xander Bogaerts and Manny Machado. We could, however, see Wagner grab a little bit of time at the keystone before the season's over, particularly in someone like Tyler Wade's stead. Left Field We heard some interesting names that A.J. Preller could target to fill the Padres' massive vacancy on the left side of the outfield grass. Luis Robert Jr. and Jarren Duran were among those floated in the days and weeks leading up to the deadline. Instead, the Padres walked away with Ramón Laureano. He's not the name he was a few years ago, but he's been on the comeback trail in 2025. Prior to the trade he was at a 144 wRC+ and a .239 isolated power. Both represent career highs. The defense isn't quite what it was when he first broke out with Oakland, but it's an upgrade from rolling Gavin Sheets out there with regularity. Center Field, Right Field Again, the picture remains set here. Jackson Merrill and Fernando Tatis, Jr. are your guys now and until the end of the decade. Bench If there's one player that stands to lose quite a lot in the midst of Thursday's trades, it's Gavin Sheets. The spring invitee was enjoying a strong season with plenty of power in his first year in San Diego before his numbers cratered in July (65 wRC+). Nevertheless, he's sure to give guys a blow in left, at first, and out of the designated hitter spot. Even with the struggles, he remains the only upside bat outside of the starting lineup, so pinch hit opportunities should be available in spades. Beyond Sheets, Díaz officially takes over as the backup backstop with Jose Iglesias, Tyler Wade, and Bryce Johnson figuring into the mix on some level. One of Iglesias or Wade, though, could be on the fringes of the roster with Wagner's arrival. Pushing Sheets to the bench helps the unit look better, at least. Starting Pitching Somewhat surprisingly, the team did not move Dylan Cease and will hope he regains his form ahead of free agency. He remains atop the rotation that remains relatively deep following the departures of Kolek & Bergert, but a little bit less stable. Baseball Prospectus has the team rolling eight deep with starting opportunities. Cease (18 percent of starts), Nick Pivetta (18 percent), Yu Darvish (16 percent), JP Sears (14 percent), and Randy Vásquez (13 percent) lead the way in projected starting opportunities. Michael King (10 percent), Nestor Cortes (9 percent), and Matt Waldron (2 percent) follow the other five. There are health questions for King & Cortes and performance questions for Darvish, Cease, and Vásquez. Nonetheless, it's an impressive group if it can even come close to touching some of the upside present. Bullpen It's unreal. The relief corps already represented the strength of the 2025 San Diego Padres. Jeremiah Estrada, Jason Adam, Adrian Morejón, and Robert Suárez at the end of games is about as tight as you can get. And then Preller acquired perhaps the most coveted reliever of them all in Mason Miller. The immediate inclination was to believe Suárez was on his way out. Instead, he remains as part of what could (should? is?) be the league's best group of relievers. BP likes Miller to take about 85 percent of the saves down the stretch with Suárez transitioning to more of an eighth inning role. That pushes everyone down a bit, leaving Yuki Matsui, David Morgan, and Wandy Peralta to serve exclusively the middle innings. Covering four or five innings with obscene velocity and some pretty silly movement? That'll work. View full article

Never count out A.J. Preller. The San Diego Padres had been quiet in the days and hours leading up to the trade deadline. Turns out, it was only so that Preller could stun us all the more with yet another blockbuster move. Preller was able to poach Mason Miller and his 104 MPH fastball away from the West Sacramento Athletics in what will surely go down as one of the louder moves of the 2025 deadline. Immediately, our mind goes to the cost. The Padres were light on marquee prospects and feature a system that, overall, sits near the bottom of the league. Prior to Thursday, we'd heard that the team was disinclined to include top prospect Leo De Vries in any deal. The same largely applied to catcher Ethan Salas, though we had heard whispers that he'd been floated as part of discussions with the Boston Red Sox surrounding Jarren Duran. Outside of those two, the Padres' top prospects aren't exactly a list full of names. Braden Nett was seen as a riser this year. Henry Baez, perhaps as an arm that could contribute as early as 2026. Preller included three out of those four — De Vries (no. 1), Nett (no. 3), and Baez (no. 13) — as part of the package to acquire Miller and starting pitcher JP Sears. Eduarniel Núñez (no. 17) was also included. Four of the top 17 prospects in a thin system seems like a wild price to pay for even a closer of Miller's caliber and a back-end starter in Sears, especially for a relief pitching-rich team like San Diego. To say nothing of the additional prospect cost in the later deal with the Baltimore Orioles. But in doing so, Preller was able to buy his team some medium-term stability. In more recent weeks, I've floated the idea that the Padres could soon find themselves in a sort of baseball purgatory. Given some of the offensive struggles we saw throughout May, June, and July, the Padres were without clear reinforcements on the position player side. The pitching staff wasn't immune to that line of thinking, however. Michael King & Dylan Cease are free agents, with the latter remaining a trade candidate. Robert Suárez can opt out of his deal and become a free agent, which seems even more likely now. Yu Darvish's first three starts on the Injured List looked objectively bad. It's been a lot of patchwork in '25, particularly on the starting side. But what Preller did in acquiring both Miller and Sears in this deal is help to mitigate some of that. Suárez will either depart on Thursday via trade or free agency. Miller becomes the team's closer for the foreseeable future, as he's under team control for four additional years; he's not a free agent until 2030. Sears doesn't have remotely the same kind of upside, but he's the kind of stable backend arm that this team has yearned for this year. He's not a free agent until 2029. So there's a lot of logic in this deal. The prospect cost was, on paper, intense. It's difficult to stomach that at first blush, for a team already struggling to keep up on the farm with so many of their National League counterparts. But someone like De Vries remains at least a couple of years away. Manny Machado is touching his mid-30s. You've got Fernando Tatis Jr and Jackson Merrill in their respective primes, with the latter likely leaving room to grow into even greater heights. There is a lot of talent on this roster in need of medium-term supplementation. Preller was able to get it. You might not like it, perhaps even more as we get closer to the end of the decade. My instinct was to loathe it, given what it required and where the system stands. But there's too much logic in it to be ignored. Preller succeeded with this one, both in the short term and in the medium term. View full article

Fernando Tatis Jr. wasn't the worst hitter in Major League Baseball in May or June... even if it felt like it at times. Coming off a blazing start to the year — which featured a .345/.409/.602 line and 184 wRC+ in March & April — the San Diego Padres' right fielder completely fell off in the two subsequent months. Not in a he's-been-just-okay-which-isn't-great-for-a-scuffling-lineup context. Like, objectively terrible. Tatis Jr. carried a .206/.313/.323 line in May & June, with a 87 wRC+. Again, he wasn't the worst in baseball (his wRC+, for example, was just the 38th-worst among qualifying hitters), but it felt like nothing was going right at the plate, even if his defense helped him to maintain value in the WAR game. There were a number of factors that could've played into such a brutal stretch for one of the game's brightest stars. Mechanical changes abounded. Approach issues might have been present. We don't know if there were any outstanding health components either given multiple hit-by-pitches sustained within that stretch. But, in those instances when you're trying to muster anything at the plate, a .233 average on balls in play certainly isn't your friend. But, that's the mark against which Tatis fought over those two middle months of the season thus far. There wasn't any particular reason for it, either, at least beyond the speculative. If we wanted to take a fairly obvious route, though, there was a blend of batted ball issues. He put the ball on the ground far too much in May (53.7 GB%) and checked in at a sub-.200 BABIP (.196). It didn't completely stabilize in June, but when he cut that groundball rate by 13 percent, he was able to drive that number up to .266. Such batted ball trends are at least somewhat indicative of why we've seen Tatis Jr. take off once again in July. Want to see a visual that depicts something incredibly obvious? It's not particularly insightful to note that a player is able to provide more offensive value when he's experiencing some batted ball luck. In Tatis' case, though, it's extremely stark. He hasn't been able to work his through the BABIP monster this year; his success has been almost entirely tied to it. As such, just how he's managing to reclaim the "luck" in July is of particular interest. As of this writing, Tatis Jr's BABIP sits at .397 for the month of July. Everything else has come with it to the tune of a .309/.429/.481 line and a 155 wRC+. The power isn't quite there yet, but a .173 isolated power is at least encouraging following a .102 ISO in June. Of course, the answer here might be disappointing in its simplicity. Explanations include the idea that Tatis is simply hitting the ball harder and at a more appropriate angle. The groundball rate is back up a touch from June (roughly 45 percent), but where Tatis Jr. has thrived is in creating line drive contact rather than true elevation. His FB%, at 23.3 percent, is his lowest of the year. His LD%, however, is his highest of the year (31.7 percent). Not only is it his highest of the year, but it's nearly double any rate he's turned in to this point. That includes March & April. For Tatis, the appropriate observation seems to be that this hasn't been so much an adjustment against pitch types, but a zone emphasis. This is the zone from March to June: And here it is in July: From these visuals, it looks like Tatis is concentrating his zone a bit more toward the outer third of the plate. Middle-middle is always going to be an area of emphasis, but it appears he's graduated from expanding a bit more vertically to stretching the zone more horizontally. Most notable is in that outer third where his groundball contact is less severe. Given a setup more toward the back corner of the box (26.3" back, 29.3" off the plate) and one of the game's longer swings (7.3 feet), it's a part of the plate that plays well. Even more so when you consider an 11-degree attack angle that is a four-degree increase from May and two from June. The July angle is one that sits well within the window of elevating the baseball. So, not only are his batted ball trends settling back to something favorable, but his mechanics are driving it. Sure enough, at 7.4 percent, Tatis Jr is experiencing his highest barrel rate since the first month of the season (more than three percent higher than May). And you really don't need more than that. Fernando Tatis Jr. is emphasizing an area of the zone that's going to allow him to get the barrel on the baseball at a higher rate. That doesn't mean we should continue to expect a BABIP figure that is touching nearly .400. But, the changes made speak to something real. If Tatis can continue to generate this kind of contact, then May & June will quickly become a distant memory in what could be a really strong second half of the year. View full article

Two things can be true. In this case, the San Diego Padres are poised to be buyers ahead of this month's July 31 trade deadline. Recent rumors, however, have pointed to the idea that they could also be sellers. It's a difficult balance to strike, but when you have leadership as aggressive as A.J. Preller, it's not an unreasonable (or unrealistic) concept. The team has very obvious needs. They need a left fielder. They need a catcher. They need help on the bench. Perhaps the pitching staff could get a bump in the form of some additional depth. It's foolhardy to think a team can address all of their needs in this mid-season window, but it stands to reason that the team could make marginal improvement (at worse) in a majority of those areas considering some of the names available. However, there's also the matter of increasing chatter that the team could aim to move on from multiple contracts, largely courtesy of Dennis Lin's column at The Athletic. Dylan Cease is the name at the forefront of such discussion, as he's set to become a free agent after the season. His name has garnered more attention over the last 48 hours or so. Closer Robert Suárez has a player opt-out that could lead to him testing the market as well. Luis Arráez represents another impending free agent, with rumors swirling (as relayed by Lin in the above column) that contenders are also interested in Jake Cronenworth. Those are some absolutely massive names on this roster. Your purported staff ace, your closer, and the starting right side of your infield. Even if Preller were to get active in moving major league talent from the roster in order to even out the collective, it's unlikely all four find new homes in the next week. But what if they did? Unrealistic as it may be, there's an argument to be made that leaning heavily into the selling side of things makes a large degree of sense for San Diego. This is an organization without a lot of talent in the upper minors. MLB Pipeline ranked the Padres 25th in their pre-season farm system rankings, while FanGraphs struck an even more dour tone by putting them 28th. There isn't a pathway for the team to improve the roster organically before roughly 2028. Which is to say nothing of the team's continued payroll restraints. Even if certain players and their respective salaries were to walk after the year, it's unlikely that the organization is going to be in a spot where they will actually deploy such savings in order to seek significant outside additions. Instead, that'll likely be another tool utilized to pin down payroll. Those two factors have the ability to rapidly catapult the Padres toward a certain kind of purgatory. Sure, you have the stars on your roster locked down for the long-term. They'll keep you interesting. But, even the game's biggest names still need to be supplemented appropriately in order to drive success for a roster. The Padres simply do not have the tools in order to do that at present, to the point where leaning more on selling than buying could go beyond being arguable. It could be necessary. It wouldn't be a seamless process. It remains to be seen if a contender will be interested in Luis Arráez's hit tool. Perhaps the fact that he's not tied to a long-term commitment could drive some interest given his ability to hit his way on base. And I've already opined that Cronenworth represents the most unreasonable to move among those mentioned or possible. His contract isn't burdensome enough to justify removing that production from the bottom half of the lineup... which is probably why contenders are interested. Cease & Suárez, however, represent desirable players for virtually any and all prospective contenders. Cease has had an uneven season, but the stuff is still very much present. A contender isn't going to shy away from that skill set just because he's staring down a 3-10 record on the year. His Whiff% (34.3) is in the 94th percentile and his K% (30.0) is in the 89th. Suárez, his 100 MPH fastball, and league-leading save count are a no-brainer acquisition for virtually any club in playoff position. Any of the four have the ability to bring back multiple players of varying skill sets and abilities. Arráez might be more likely to bring back a post-hype prospect or fringe-type. Cronenworth, should they choose to move him, could yield more. Cease & Suárez, though, could be worth truly premium returns considering the vast need for pitching on both sides from virtually everywhere and the respective upside that each possesses. Why, though, would a contending team trade away such important pieces? There's a rationale here that the team could remain on a similar trajectory as they are at present without the likes of Cease or Suárez or even Arráez (Cronenworth's context remains just a little bit different). On the Cease front, the team has staved off an injury to Michael King and an extended absence from Yu Darvish in piecing together a reasonably-performing staff. It's been imperfect, but with Darvish now back in the fold, there's an argument to be made that the team could part Cease's uneven performance and continue to manage with the likes of Randy Vásquez, Stephen Kolek, and Ryan Bergert. It's a flimsy one, but it's an argument nonetheless, especially if you get back the value his upside indicates you could to improve the roster elsewhere. In Suárez's case, it's a little firmer of an argument. The Padres have an elite bullpen. It stands to reason that any of Jeremiah Estrada, Jason Adam, or Adrian Morejón could be due for an expanded role. We'll likely see such a scenario play out in 2026 anyway, as each of the trio remains under team control through at least next year. The positional side of things is a little more difficult to navigate. The Arráez of it all is as enigmatic as his overall performance. Despite continuing to rack up singles, he's provided little overall value by wRC+ (103) or on the defensive side. But, that hit tool and his history could be tantalizing for the right club that needs just a little bit more contact in their lineup. Cronenworth, again, is in a different situation given his contract and more varied production he brings into the fold. Again, the way in which the Padres could approach the deadline will be an extremely difficult needle to thread. Teams don't typically explore both sides of the strategy this time of year. But when you consider the context in which the Padres find themselves, the logic becomes increasingly clear. View full article

On Tuesday, The Athletic's Dennis Lin published a column in which he explored how the San Diego Padres could approach the trade deadline with respect to future needs. The premise therein speaks to the idea that the organization could use the deadline not only to address immediate holes in the roster, but utilize some of their current major league talent in a trade with more of an eye on future projection. As such, it does lend itself to the idea that the Padres could move someone like, say, impending free agent Dylan Cease. Or Robert Suárez, who could test the free agent market via an opt-out after the 2025 season draws to a close. While a mid-season departure for either would represent some level of damage for the roster, there is some logic in the discussion given some of the team's payroll constraints and lack of impact talent in the upper levels of the minors. It's a difficult needle to thread, though, to be sure. When Jake Cronenworth's name is invoked in said column, however, the clarity of such rationalization starts to become a little murkier. Now, Lin didn't say that the Padres were actively shopping any of the three players. In Cronenworth's case, it was more of a note that contenders were interested. And while the same justification for exploring a trade of Cease or Suárez could be applied to Cronenworth, his role and his contract would appear to shift the context into something much more difficult to justify. Cronenworth isn't an elite bat. He hasn't returned to his 2021 levels of power (.194 ISO), nor has he shown an ability to get back to his 2022 levels of defensive stability (three Outs Above Average). But this is a Padres lineup that is already top-heavy. The skill set offered by the team's keystone player is something that remains useful, especially down the lineup. Earlier in the year, we discussed Cronenworth's walk rate as being responsible for propping up his overall offensive production. Roughly a month-and-a-half later, that component still sits as his greatest asset. His 12.9 percent walk rate is not only the highest of his career, but the top rate on a team that has been middle-of-the-road in working their way on base via the free pass. It's an asset in itself. But since that writing, it's not his only one. The power has returned in a fairly notable way. No, Cronenworth isn't approaching a .200 ISO again. But, his .163 mark is his best since that 2021 campaign. He's parlayed that patience into his highest hard hit rate since 2020 (38.7 percent) while generating the most fly ball contact that he's seen since '22. It's been a process toward finally settling back into the type of player he was purported to be a few seasons ago. In terms of the defense, he's experienced a bounce back in moving back to second base on a (mostly) full-time basis. His Fielding Run Value sits at exactly average for the year. So, you're getting above average offensive production (119 wRC+) and average defense out of a secondary contributor to your lineup. In short, he's serving exactly the type of role you'd want him to be serving. And at an reasonable price. Cronenworth's average salary sits a shade above $11 million. He ranks ninth among second basemen in that regard and 41st among all infielders. At present, Cronenworth's 1.6 fWAR ranks 10th among second basemen with at least 250 plate appearances. Another way to read this is the Padres are essentially getting exactly what they're paying for. And, while he'll see a $1 million bump in each of the next three seasons, it remains an entirely reasonable contract. Plus, none of this discussion mentions that the Padres don't have infielders coming up through the pipeline. Leo De Vries is the team's top prospect but is unlikely to move off shortstop (leaving him more as a part of a separate Xander Bogaerts discussion). MLB Pipeline's other top Padres prospects include Cobb Hightower, Deivid Coronil, and Jhoan De La Cruz. Hightower is the oldest of the group, at 20 years old, and none are projected to arrive at the top level before 2028. The team simply does not have the organizational infrastructure at present to give a youngster an opportunity in Cronenworth's stead. That stands in contrast to Cease & Suárez, where the team has proven capable of providing sufficient depth (more so in Suárez's case, where one of the other elite late-inning guys could step into his big shoes). Again, we don't have anything to suggest that the Padres are actively exploring moving Jake Cronenworth. But, with the idea that the Padres want to keep an eye on the horizon and contenders being interested in his services, it isn't an impossible scenario. The context is just so vastly different from his veteran counterparts on the mound, making it a really tough sell were A.J. Preller to act on such a move. View full article

There isn't enough time left in the calendar to change the trade deadline path for the San Diego Padres. They'll land on the buying side of things. Winning three of their last four series (and splitting the other) has given them some breathing room in the wild card race, while the Los Angeles Dodgers' struggles have given them some renewed life on the divisional side as well. That stretch has expelled any doubt that A.J. Preller will be a busy man ahead of July 31st. Of course, we know he's also working with limited resources relative to some National League counterparts. Preller's prior aggressive trades have left the farm system in the league's bottom half, which will make it difficult for the Padres to address multiple needs to the level they may require. Nevertheless, certain positions require more immediate upgrades than others ahead of the end of the month. Below, we rank the San Diego roster by positional value, working our way from area of lowest (or, in some cases, non) need to spots with the most dire situation. Right Field: 3.9 fWAR, 127 wRC+, 8 FRV Fernando Tatis Jr. has been able to maintain a spot among the highest Wins Above Replacement output primarily on the strength of his defense. The offense faded after a strong start, but he has started to regain form after a brutal May & June (148 wRC+ in July). At his best, there are a small handful of players better than the Padres' right fielder. As long as he's healthy, this isn't even a minor area of need this month. Third Base: 3.3 fWAR, 141 wRC+, -4 FRV As stable as the Padres are in right field, Manny Machado offers much the same at the hot corner. He's at a 137 wRC+, which would represent his best overall output since 2022. The strikeout rate is down, the walk rate is up, and the power has bounced back after a quiet start to the year. His defense isn't quite what it was, but he compensates effectively enough courtesy of everything he does on the offensive side. Again, nothing to see here. Shortstop: 2.6 fWAR, 102 wRC+, 8 FRV Weirdly, the San Diego Padres can be fine down the stretch with Xander Bogaerts starting at the six. I say weirdly because there was a point earlier this year when we were ready to call it quits on any hope for Bogaerts and the eight years he'll have left on his contract after 2025. However, his offense has stabilized, and he has risen to the positive wRC+ threshold (107) while offering solid defense. There isn't much power to speak of, but he's compensated well with his walk rate and baserunning. There's value here that we didn't think still existed in May. No reason to think anything will change at shortstop now. Center Field: 1.9 fWAR, 104 wRC+, 5 FRV Jackson Merrill has endured two separate Injured List stints and, as such, has been unable to find his footing in 2025. Nevertheless, he's still an above-average bat with an above-average glove. The Padres will hope he can rediscover some of his power in the second half, but he still offers the same level of stability that his above comrades provide. Second Base: 0.9 fWAR, 97 wRC+, -3 FRV Could the Padres stand for more production from the keystone? Maybe. But Jake Cronenworth is quietly turning in a very solid year with a career-best .356 on-base percentage and more power than we've seen since 2021 (.166 ISO). The defense isn't terrific, and we had some questions about his value as a walks-only bat. Still, when you consider the approach and now-present occasional power, he's an excellent down-the-order bat considering the output. First Base: 0.5 fWAR, 111 wRC+, -6 FRV If the phrase "it is what it is" were a position, then first base would be that for San Diego. Luis Arráez is up to his usual stuff. The singles merchant isn't hitting for quite the same average, but .284 is still more than respectable. The strikeout rate is a hilarious 2.9 percent. You'd like more impact here, but you're still getting the hit tool. The larger concern lies on the defensive end. Arráez is part of the league's worst defensive group at first base. Nothing about the profile suggests him as a long-term option. However, you have nowhere else to put him (if other needs are addressed appropriately), and there isn't a wealth of first-base talent available on the market. You'll just have to bear it through the end of the year as is. Designated Hitter: -1.6 fWAR, 70 wRC+ This is where the must-acquire types begin. Fifteen different players have received at least one appearance as the team's DH, with only Gavin Sheets appearing in more than 15 games out of that spot. In an ideal world, you acquire a left fielder and relegate him specifically to these duties. Given the year he's turning in, you're likely to get more out of the spot than you have at any other point. So it isn't as much about acquiring a bat specifically as it is acquiring a positional bat that allows you to fill this position more organically. It's a need, for sure, but one that can be addressed by filling one of the two more pressing needs that follow. Left Field: -0.3 fWAR, 73 wRC+, 0 FRV Six teams have gotten less overall value, and only four have gotten less offensive value out of left field than the Padres. Things looked much worse before Sheets took over more of a full-time role, but his defense is still hazardous at best. You want someone who can provide offensive value and at least average defense to start solidifying things. This is where the organic improvement I mentioned earlier can begin to take hold. Acquiring even an average player to throw in left allows you to move Sheets to the DH spot. And while he has helped shore up some of the offensive shortcomings, that this still exists as the team's second-biggest need ahead of the deadline speaks to how dire things have been since Jurickson Profar's departure. Catcher: -0.8 fWAR, 67 wRC+, -10 FRV Things are quite bad behind the plate. Offensively, defensively, it doesn't particularly matter. The duo of Elias Diaz and Martín Maldonado has been the league's second-worst tandem in terms of fWAR. Typically, teams don't love the idea of trading for a catcher in-season. You've got pitching staffs to navigate, after all. However, considering the current situation, it's the team's most pressing need. If not on the offensive side — offensively-adept catchers are still fairly rare — then it'll help out your pitching staff in a number of ways. It also represents perhaps the easiest pathway to improvement when considering some of the help that might be available from other organizations soon (e.g., Reese McGuire, Korey Lee, etc.). 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To refer to a baseball player as a Quad-A, Quadruple-A, or AAAA type is indicative of a player who is too good for Triple-A baseball but can't hack it at the major league level. The San Diego Padres may have such a player in their organization at present in the form of Luis Campusano. Only possible, though, as we don't have a large enough sample to confirm whether or not that's the case. Drafted out of a Georgia high school in 2018, Campusano's first extended look at the top level came in 2023. Campusano served as Gary Sánchez's backup for the majority of the year, turning in a 133 wRC+ and 1.1 fWAR. He parlayed that into an extra 120 plate appearances last year but regressed on both sides of the ball (83 wRC+, -0.5 fWAR) and ceded his job to Kyle Higashioka as the season wore on. Ahead of the 2025 season, the Padres chose to roll with a combination of Elias Diaz and Martín Maldonado behind the plate. Díaz was a late-season pickup in 2024, signed by the team to a new deal last winter, while Maldonado rode his outdated reputation as a defensive stopper behind the plate to a non-roster deal. Rather than extend another opportunity to Campusano, Mike Shildt & Co. decided to roll with the pair of veterans behind the dish for '25. It's a move that has not panned out at all. Maldonado, in particular, has compounded below-average offense (46 wRC+) with well-below-average defense. Statcast has him at -8 Blocks Above Average, -1 Framing Runs, and -6 Caught Stealing Above Average. Díaz hasn't been much better offensively (62 wRC+), but he's at least been passable with the glove via 2 Blocks Above Average and 1 Catcher's CS Above Average (though his framing is worse than Maldonado's at -3 Framing Runs). Such brutal production out of one spot assuredly indicates that A.J. Preller will prioritize a move for a catcher ahead of this month's trade deadline. A marginal improvement like the Cubs' Reese McGuire or Korey Lee of the White Sox would at least offer a boost to a positional group in need of it. But would it be entirely unreasonable in the interim for the Padres to consider Campusano for an extended look before such an acquisition were to transpire? Campusano has not been a good defensive catcher in his time with the Padres. Across two years of action, he went -11 in Blocks Above Average, -10 in Framing Runs, and -5 in CS Above Average. We don't have such data available from El Paso to determine whether or not Campusano has demonstrated any growth on that side of the ball in Triple-A, but considering that his numbers across two years aren't that much worse than what Maldonado, in particular, has turned in within half of just one, it's something worth considering, especially when you factor in the offensive side. We know Campusano has upside that neither Díaz (at this stage) nor Maldonado (at any point in his career) possesses. And he's done nothing but mash in Triple-A this year. Through a shade over 250 PA with El Paso, Campusano has wRC+'d 140. He carries a .308/.427/.587 line and a walk rate (16.3 percent) that narrowly exceeds his strikeout rate (16.0). His isolated power checks in at .279. Among 55 qualifying Triple-A hitters, the wRC+ ranks second, the slug/ISO figures sit fifth & sixth, and the on-base percentage is pacing the group. He's been one of the best hitters that the Pacific Coast League has to offer. That, dear reader, is the component that the Padres need to consider at this immediate point in time. The Padres are a team starved for offense. Catcher and left field are the two spots at which they've gotten almost zero production. The defensive caveat is a difficult one to ignore, but it's possible that the difference between Campusano & Maldonado could be negligible at this point. Why not take a run at an upside play if it could, potentially, allow you to deploy your resources elsewhere prior to July 31st? It is worth noting that Campusano does have 27 PA to his credit at the top level this year. He's accrued exactly zero hits in that time. However, there has also been no stability in his opportunities. He saw 10 chances at the start of May, was called up again 19 days later for another seven, and waited five days for another pair of plate appearances before the month's end. He scattered another five PAs across two appearances in mid-June before getting a start as the DH on July 13th, before another demotion. Twenty-seven plate appearances are a small enough sample on their own. Let alone when opportunities are scarce. Ultimately, though, the Padres and Luis Campusano are at a crucial point in their relationship. If, at this point, the team refuses to give him a shot, considering the context unfolding behind the plate, it's likely never coming. Considering the upside with the stick, you'd like to see a stable bit of opportunity to perhaps inject a little life into a position that has lacked it in 2025. At best, you're getting an in-house upgrade. At worst, it's the status quo. Campusano may very well be a Quad-A player. It's worth finding out for sure. View full article

Our eyes are the great deceivers. They're riddled with confirmation bias. Baseball might just prove this more than any other sight which they can observe. The latest example is my own subscribing to the idea that the San Diego Padres are driving their bullpen into the ground with short outings. The eye test is famously a failure when compared to hard data. In this case, the eye test spent a good deal of the first half telling me that the Padres weren't getting what they needed out of their starters in terms of length. Such an outcome would hardly be a surprise. We've watched Randy Vásquez struggle to work through multiple outings. The rest of the rotation has been filled, at times, out by the inexperienced likes of Stephen Kolek, Kyle Hart, and Ryan Bergert. Yu Darvish's return isn't going to offer much in the short-term length department, either, as he works his way back to full strength. Given such context, my eyes were entirely of the mind that the Padres were leaning too heavily on their vaunted bullpen. It is, of course, a relief corps worth leaning on. Padres' relievers are second in the league in ERA (3.20), sixth in the league in strikeout rate (24.3 percent), and fifth in the league in Hard-Hit% allowed (37.7 percent). But there's a little bit of a temperance factor, as well. One starts to wonder how sustainable such success can be in the long-term when you're regularly being deployed on the earlier end of the middle innings. Except that's not entirely what's happening. It's not what's happening at all. The average length of a start in all of Major League Baseball in 2025 is 5.2 innings. The Padres are at exactly that mark (the Philadelphia Phillies lead the league with 5.7 per start). While starters are throwing a volume of pitches per inning that ranks on the higher end of the league (16.47 pitches per inning), it hasn't manifested into markedly shorter outings in a broad sense. Of those that have started at least a game on the bump for San Diego this year, it's probably not surprising to know that each of Vásquez (5.0 IP/GS), Bergert (4.6), and Hart (4.3) falls below the league average. Yu Darvish, at 4.2 IP/GS, also falls in with that group through his two starts. The rest of the staff, meanwhile, has largely kept things together. Nick Pivetta is at 5.8 IP/GS, Michael King was at 5.6 prior to his injury, and Dylan Cease is at 5.4. Even Stephen Kolek has worked to a steady 5.7 IP/GS with a couple of clunkers mixed in. So while there have been questions about efficiency within starts, those that were expected to hold things down in terms of volume have (when healthy). While certain starters require more innings from the bullpen, it's not something that has translated into an abnormal volume. At 348.2 innings, the Padres rank only 13th in usage. Of the 174 qualifying relievers throughout MLB, five Padres sit inside the top 60: Jason Adam (47.2), Adrian Morejón (43.2), Jeremiah Estrada (43.0), Wandy Peralta (42.1), and Robert Suárez (40.2). In other words, three All-Stars (Adam, Morejón, and Suárez) and a late-inning guy (Estrada). So it's more a matter of Mike Shildt leaning on his upper-tier arms than any deficiency being wrought by an inefficient rotation. The concept of leverage further illustrates this thinking. FanGraphs' Leverage Index quantifies the cruciality for individual players and classifies it into low, medium, and high leverage. The Average Leverage Index illustrates just that: in what type of leverage do players most often find themselves? The Padres' relief corps is at a 1.19 pLI, which ranks third in the league. That puts them firmly in medium-leverage situations, on average (defined as 0.85 to 2.0). By being involved in late-inning action, the leverage is automatically going to increase from what might be considered the lower end of the spectrum. So that figure lands kind of where one might expect without any indication of being regularly pressed into situations that were left by their starters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the top four arms in pLI for San Diego in 2025 go Suárez (2.26), Adam (1.81), Estrada (1.62), and Morejón (1.46). Your closer in high-leverage and reliable arms at the upper end of medium just reads as logical. Names like Yuki Matsui (0.80) and Peralta (0.69), meanwhile, represent bullpen regulars that serve in the realm of lower leverage (under 0.85). Between the usage and the leverage, there just isn't anything to indicate that the starting pitching has been in any way damaging to the relief group. Which entirely speaks to the fact that our eyes deceive us. Or these eyes have seen a disproportionate amount of starts from Randy Vásquez this year. Either way, the reliance on an excellent bullpen isn't visibly coming at the expense of their longer-term efficiency. View full article

It sort of boggles the mind, given how the first half progressed, but the San Diego Padres will begin the unofficial second half of the season in National League Wild Card contention. Winning two of their last three series (and managing a split in the other) afforded them such positioning by a half game over the San Francisco Giants. But if the team is going to secure such a berth in the next couple of months, the offense is going to have to play its part. If you've watched even a small sample of Padres baseball since mid-May, you know most periods of struggle for this team are due to the offense. In contention on the strength of their pitching, the top-heavy attack has had trouble piecing together even multiple innings of run production, let alone multiple games of it. Indeed, the numbers since that point provide a fairly objective measure by which to evaluate the offense. Since May 16th, the Padres are 27th in the league in runs (187). They're hitting just .231 as a collective (also 27th) with a .301 on-base percentage (25th). Power production has been an issue all year, but only the Pittsburgh Pirates have an isolated power figure worse than San Diego's .123 ISO since that point. Almost no member of the Padres has been immune to the struggle. Fernando Tatis Jr. fell into an offensive void in May from which he's just now beginning to emerge. Jackson Merrill has been working with a power deficiency on either end of his multiple injured-list stints. Jake Cronenworth is a walk merchant without much else, while Luis Arráez is of the same descriptor if we substituted walks for singles. Xander Bogaerts spent all of June working his way to even being an average bat. Even Manny Machado got off to a slow start. This, despite the team's struggles to find any sort of offensive stability in left field and behind the plate. The offensive component isn't an isolated issue; it's a collective one. As such, it's going to take a collective shift in philosophy if the Padres are going to start generating run production with a little more consistency. That begins with the approach. Plate discipline numbers don't give us the whole story, but they do have a lot to say about the 2025 San Diego Padres. Their 3.80 pitches per plate appearance ranks 24th in the league. For context, the Miami Marlins have the league's worst mark at 3.74 P/PA. They rank only 19th in Swing% (47.0) but sit fifth in chase rate (32.9). Their swing rate inside the strike zone, meanwhile, ranks only 28th (65.6 percent). Those are some problematic components, indicative of a team that isn't overly aggressive but simply makes poor choices at the plate. What they can do, however, is maintain solid contact rates. Their 79.0 Contact% is the sixth-best rate in the league while maintaining one of the league's lowest whiff rates (9.9). The overall swing rate has also helped buoy the team's walk rate, at 8.6 percent for the season (13th). Their strikeout rate, at 19.5 percent, is also tied for the third-lowest rate in the league at present. In a vacuum, you'd rather have more balls in play than fewer balls in play. However, given the disparity between swing rates inside and out of the strike zone, the team has been unable to parlay steady contact into good contact. The Padres' 36.6 Hard-Hit% in 2025 is the second-lowest rate of hard contact (defined as 95 MPH or more). Only Cleveland has a lower rate of hard contact. If we consider only the stretch since May 16th, the Padres actually have an identical rate to the Guardians in terms of quality of contact. Their 7.0 Barrel% is the third-lowest rate in that respect. When you factor in a 44.1 percent groundball rate and a 27.0 Oppo%, it's sort of a marvel that this team is hanging at even a (22nd-ranked) .285 BABIP. From the outside, there doesn't appear to be a lot of intentionality behind how they're approaching each plate appearance. Also worth noting in this discussion is Pull AIR%. Sort of the statistical darling of the 2025 season, the idea is that teams that can pull the ball in the air are going to create more offense, as 66 percent of all home runs over the three seasons before 2025 came on such contact. The Padres rank 28th in the league in Pull AIR% (15.4 percent), which speaks to their lack of overall power. Not that you have to pull the ball in the air to find offensive success. The Milwaukee Brewers are one of the two teams behind the Padres. At the same time, middle-tier run producers – the Philadelphia Phillies, New York Mets, and Athletics, for example — are all somewhat adjacent to them in the Pull AIR% rankings. The difference is that those teams walk more than the Padres and steal more bases than the Padres. They also have more isolated power scattered throughout the lineup. There are ways to compensate, but the Padres don't have a lineup built to do so. As such, increasing the discipline aspect will be a central factor in the team's ability to produce runs. The Padres are not an aggressive team, but they do exercise poor plate discipline. There's just too much expansion of the zone to generate contact, so the actual quality of contact is suffering as a result. There is more power than this lineup has realized thus far (even if it's not necessarily home run power). Power is derived from quality contact. Quality contact is derived from a strong approach. One thing begets another. So there's a certain onus on the Padres to start at a more foundational level in the second half. We don't know what A.J. Preller has planned for the lineup. However, given the limited resources at his disposal, the improvements will likely be marginal. As top-heavy as the San Diego Padres are, they're also a team with a stronger volume of quality bats than has been demonstrated to date. The approach needs to come through, though, if that's to be realized. View full article

Wherever they may be, it's clear that the baseball gods have chosen not to favor the San Diego Padres since the middle of May. After a blazing start to the year, they finished that month 13-13 before turning in a 13-15 June. As of this writing, they're off to a 4-3 start in July. It's been a good deal of middling baseball wrought by a shallow lineup more than anything, leaving the Padres fading in the division and currently on the outside of the Wild Card picture in the National League. Given where the problems this year have tended to find their origin, it's probably not surprising to find Xander Bogaerts central to most discussions about this team. The phrases have been bandied about include things like "sunk cost" and — for the more optimistic in the fanbase — "salary dump." Not ideal for a player in the third year of an 11-year pact. Indeed, a great deal of ink has been spilt surrounding Bogaerts' 2025 and the fear over what the remainder of his deal could look like. Considering such pessimism, it might surprise to find that Bogaerts actually had quite a good month of June. It was lost in the midst of .500 baseball, but there was a steady performer lining up at the six for San Diego last month: By both wOBA and wRC+, Bogaerts was actually the team's best hitter last month. He also led the team in average, trailed only Fernando Tatis Jr. in on-base percentage, and struck out at a rate that was higher than only Luis Arráez. Mixed in that month was a stretch of five consecutive at-bats with a hit and five multi-hit games overall. His power remained modest, but that's likely going to have to be a reality with which the Padres deal with moving forward. If he's proving a fixture on base, though, he's already proven to be adept at contributing in other ways. But, in observing such vast improvement from the first two months of the year, should we put any stock into what Bogaerts did in June? Especially considering that his July is already off to start of a much lower tier? In attempting to break with what I'm coining "The Great Padres Pessimism of Summer 2025", the answer is a resounding... maybe. The simplest observation to make about Bogaerts' June is that he swung the bat more. His 41.7 percent swing rate was his highest in an individual month through that point. What was impressive was that he upped the chase (23.0 percent) but didn't lose anything on the contact end (only a two point rise in Whiff%). For Bogaerts, the result of increased aggression was simply more balls in play: An obvious byproduct of that is that he didn't walk as much. But, he also struck out at easily his lowest rate of the season in a given month. That seems like an acceptable trade-off for a team that needs offensive creation to come from somewhere outside of the top guys in the lineup. Especially with someone possessing the awareness of the zone that Bogaerts has demonstrated in 2025. At the same time, there's a (potentially) intense caveat within this. Pitchers approached Bogaerts entirely different than they had in either of the first two months: Bogaerts received a near-ten-percent bump in the amount of fastballs he saw in May, which was already an increase in what he'd seen in March & April. For many hitters, the prospect of seeing that many fastballs and gaining an uptick in performance isn't something you want to see. It would read as more mirage than reality as pitchers would simply adjust again the following month. Instead, it looks as if the increased swing rate was due to the increase in fastballs but not the increased performance. That's an important distinction. Bogaerts wasn't doing his best work against fastballs; his higher hard hit rate still came against off-speed and breaking pitches. But he was able to become more aggressive as a result of simply seeing more fastballs, allowing for an overall swing increase. The contact ability has remained through these struggles, so it stands to reason that his contact ability deserves more credit for turning in a strong month than anything coming out of the pitcher's hand. It's not as if there was some absurd average on balls in play to emerge from it, either. His .310 BABIP remained an entirely reasonable figure. If anything, we're seeing this increased aggression from Bogaerts continue in July. It's just manifesting in a different area of the BABIP spectrum. Bogaerts' Swing% through his first few games in June is 42.9. That's about a one percent increase from June (which was a three percent increase from May). There's been a bit more whiff but the expected metrics really like what he's doing thus far: The results haven't been there quite yet, but the expected average (.314) and expected slug (.432) are among his best. While there are likely more intricacies occurring underneath the surface, there's plenty of evidence pointing us in the direction of a more aggressive Xander Bogaerts being a more effective Xander Bogaerts. Of course, we'll need a larger sample in July before coming to any firm conclusions on it. Many of the numbers don't look great so far (.289 wOBA, for example), but it doesn't seem as if June was entirely luck. Bogaerts has enough control of the strike zone that he can afford to be more aggressive in order to create offense. If the trends in June are any indication, he could spend the remainder of the summer proving just that. View full article